

AGENDA
City of Los Angeles
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS BOARD

REGULAR MEETING

Monday, September 17, 2012
1:30 P.M.
Media Center Conference Room
Emergency Operations Center
500 E. Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012

Members of the public are invited to address the Emergency Operations Board on any item on the agenda prior to action by the Board on that specific item. Members of the public may also address the Board on any matter within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Board. The Board will entertain such comments during the Public Comment Period. Public comment will be limited to two (2) minutes per individual for each item addressed, unless there are more than ten (10) comment cards for each item, in which case the public comment will be limited to one (1) minute per individual. The aforementioned limitation may be waived by the Chair of the Board.

(NOTE: Pursuant to Government Code Section 54954.3(b) the legislative body of a local agency may adopt reasonable regulations, including, but not limited to, regulations limiting the total amount of time allocated for public testimony on particular issues and for each individual speaker.)

Members of the public who wish to address the Board are urged to complete a Speaker Card and submit it to the Executive Assistant prior to commencement of the public meeting. The cards are available at the sign in table at the meeting or the Emergency Management Department public counter, Room 1533, City Hall. However, should a member of the public feel the need to address a matter while the meeting is in progress, a card may be obtained from the Executive Assistant to the Board, who will submit the completed card to the Chair of the Board prior to final consideration of the matter.

It is requested that individuals who require the services of a translator contact the Board Secretary no later than the day preceding the meeting. Whenever possible, a translator will be provided.

Sign language interpreters, assistive listening devices, or other auxiliary aids and/or services may be provided upon request. To ensure availability, you are advised to make your request at least 72 hours prior to the meeting you wish to attend.

NOTE: The meeting is tape-recorded and the tape is kept for 30 days.

I. Declaration of Quorum; Introductions; Approval of July 16, 2012 Minutes

II. Action Item

A. December 2011 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Meta-Event Exercise Activation After Action Report/Improvement Plan – Rob Freeman

Recommendation

That the Emergency Operations Board, as recommended by the Emergency Management Committee, approve and forward to the Mayor for transmittal to the City Council, the December 2011 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Meta-Event Exercise Activation After Action Report/Improvement Plan.

III. Information Items

A. August 2012 Heat Event – James Featherstone

B. 2012 405 Freeway Closure (Carmageddon II)/Triathlon – James Featherstone

C. Space Shuttle Endeavor Arrival – James Featherstone

D. 2013 Mid-Year EOO Workshop – Carol Parks

E. City of Los Angeles Annual EOC Exercise – James Featherstone

F. Executive Crisis Communications Program (Phase I) – Carol Parks

G. Other Announcement – Board Members

IV. Presentations (as requested)

V. Public Comment Period

VI. Adjournment

Upon request, sign language interpretation, real-time translation services, agenda materials in alternative formats, and other accommodations are available to the public for City-sponsored meetings and events. All requests for reasonable accommodations must be made at least three working days (72-hours) in advance of the scheduled meeting date. For additional information, contact the Emergency Management Department at (213) 485-2121.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE



Date: September 7, 2012

To: Charlie Beck, Chair
Emergency Operations Board

Emergency Operations Board Members

From: Anna Burton, Executive Assistant
Emergency Operations Board

A handwritten signature in red ink, appearing to read "Anna Burton", is written over the printed name and title.

Subject: **DECEMBER 2011 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)
FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE ACTIVATION AFTER ACTION
REPORT/IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

Recommendation

That the Emergency Operations Board, as recommended by the Emergency Management Committee, approve and forward to the Mayor for transmittal to the City Council, the December 2011 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Meta-Event Exercise Activation After Action Report/Improvement Plan.

Executive Summary

Pursuant to terms of the City's Emergency Operations Plan, the Emergency Management Department (EMD) is responsible for preparing an After Action/Corrective Action Report for each activation of the City's EOC. On December 7, 2011, the EOC was activated for an EOC Functional Meta-Event Exercise. The exercise was designed to establish a learning environment for players to focus on the EOC, Department Operations Center (DOC), and initial response actions during the "Hyper-Dynamic Phase" of a Mumbai Type Meta-Terrorism Event. The assessment of EOC and DOC emergency response policies and procedures for information collection, sharing and decision making was the primary goal of the exercise. Additional exercise goals included validating the EOC training conducted to date, as well as identifying where potential planning, training or equipment gaps might exist.

The attached report represents a summarization of individual reports from each of the involved agencies. This report was approved by the Emergency Management Committee at its September 5, 2012, meeting with the recommendation it be forwarded to the Board for approval. If approved, EMD will forward the report to the Mayor for transmittal to the City Council.

EMD will track areas recommended for improvement and, as appropriate, report back through the Emergency Operations Organization.

Attachment - December 2011 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Meta-Event Exercise Activation After Action Report/Improvement Plan

CITY OF LOS ANGELES

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

Date: August 23, 2012

To: Anna Burton, Chair
Emergency Management Committee

Emergency Management Committee Members

From: Quentin M. Frazier, Training & Exercise Unit Leader
Emergency Management Department

Subject: **DECEMBER 2011 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC)
FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE ACTIVATION AFTER ACTION
REPORT/IMPROVEMENT PLAN**

Recommendation

That the Emergency Management Committee (EMC) approve and forward to the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) for approval the attached After Action Report/Improvement Plan regarding the December 2011 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Functional Meta-Event Exercise Activation.

Executive Summary

The EOC Functional Meta-Event Exercise, conducted on December 7, 2011, was designed to establish a learning environment for players to focus on the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), or participating Department Operations Center (DOC), initial response actions during the 'Hyper-Dynamic Phase' of a Mumbai Type Meta-Terrorism Event. The assessment of EOC and DOC emergency response policies and procedures for information collection and sharing and decision-making was the primary goal of the exercise. Additional exercise goals included validating the EOC Training conducted to date, as well as identifying where potential planning, training or equipment gaps might exist.

The purpose of the exercise was to evaluate how EOC Sections, Branches and Units, as well as participating DOCs were able to demonstrate, document and report on their specific information, based upon their assigned roles and responsibilities, during the initial response phase.

The scope of play for this EOC Functional Meta-Event Exercise required EOC and DOC responders to perform activities associated with the initial response to a Meta-Event incident within the City of Los Angeles. These activities, defined as performance capabilities, included EOC Management, inter-/intra-EOC Communications, and Public Information.

All EOC Coordination Staff positions (Sections, Branches and Units) were required to document and demonstrate the movement of critical information (from their individual position assignments, department or agency status reports and any coordination activities they had undertaken) up to their respective EOC Supervisor or Manager for evaluation and prioritization. Section Coordinators then determined, based upon information gathered from multiple sources, what information would be included in the initial situation report for EOC Management. Observation of this process formed the basis for evaluation on whether information was correctly shared and reported, as required under City of Los Angeles EOC Coordination Planning protocols. Exercise injects were used specifically within each activated EOC position to ensure information moved up and down the EOC organization.

This exercise was not designed to exercise how City Departments would tactically respond to an event. The exercise scenario was designed only to allow for the evaluation of initial EOC processes, specifically the information collection, information sharing, EOC Management decision-making, and the coordination processes within the EOC and participating DOCs.



December 2011

Functional Meta-Event Exercise EOC
Activation After Action
Report/Improvement Plan

December 7, 2011



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I. EXERCISE DESCRIPTION

A. Event Name

2011 City of Los Angeles EOC Functional Meta-Event Exercise

B. Event Date(s)

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

C. Exercise Time/Duration

Exercise play began at 0645 hours with scenario injects going into the LAPD Real Time Analysis and Critical Response (RACR). The Initial Situational Analysis Briefing occurred at 1100 hours, with exercise play ending at 1200 hours. A hot-wash occurred immediately after exercise termination for EOC policy staff, management and coordination staffs, and exercise controllers.

D. Activation Level

The EOC was activated to a Level III Bravo (Law Enforcement Lead).

E. Lead Agency

The EOC operated under Unified Command, with LAPD functioning as the EOC Director and LAFD and EMD acting as Deputy EOC Directors.

F. Participating/Supporting Agencies

- Office of the Mayor
- City Administrative Officer (CAO)
- City Attorney's Office
- Emergency Management Department (EMD)
- Fire Department (LAFD)
- Department of General Services (GSD)
- Information Technology Agency (ITA)
- Police Department (LAPD)
- Department of Public Works (DPW)

- Department of Recreation and Parks (RAP)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
- Department of Water and Power (DWP)
- Department of Building & Safety (LADBS)
- LA World Airports (LAWA)
- Harbor Department
- Department on Disability (DOD)
- American Red Cross (ARC)
- Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD)
- Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management (LA Co. OEM)
- Ventura County Office of Emergency Management (OEM)

G. Exercise Event Chronology

Four (4) specific terrorism scenarios began at 0645 hours, replicating a Mumbai-type series of terrorist events occurring within the boundaries of the City of Los Angeles. Initial field-specific scenario information was pushed directly into LAPD's Real-time Analysis & Critical Response Center (RACR), which also functioned as the LAPD's Department Operating Center (DOC) after activation.

RACR was then tasked to coordinate incident information with the EMD Duty Officer during the initial incident notification and EOC activation phases. Scenario information for four distinct and geographically separate incidents was given to RACR, beginning at 0645 hours by designated LAPD Exercise Controllers. Information from each incident was interspersed to simulate how information would be received from dispatch centers to field units and then into RACR. All scenario inject information was fed into RACR by 0945 hours.

A secondary source of field information, specific to the West Bureau (LAX) scenario, came directly from L.A World Airport's Airport Response & Coordination Center (ARCC) into RACR. Field specific scenario information was also designed to come from LAFD's Fire Metro and DOC (when activated), through the EOC Operations Section's Fire Branch.

Based upon the combined scenario information, the EOC was activated at 0800 hours with notification to EOC responders beginning at that time.

The EOC was considered activated at 0830 hours, with the EOC Directors and key Coordination Staff (Section Coordinators) on scene. A hasty briefing was held with this group in the Main Coordination Room, beginning at 0840 hours, which concluded at 0855 hours. At the conclusion of this briefing, the EOC Directors asked that an emergency proclamation be drafted for possible release later.

EOC Sections, Branches and Units began receiving EOC position-specific exercise injects, (*i.e. information and prompts provided to specific individuals requiring them to carry out specific and documented actions, in a simulated fashion*) from designated EOC Exercise Controllers beginning at 0830 hours and continuing until 1015 hours.

Information gathering from all EOC Sections by the Plans Section was initiated immediately upon position activation, in close cooperation with the Operations Section.

At 0910 hours, the EOC Director and Deputies were working hard in an attempt to gain and maintain situational awareness.

At 0930 hours, LAPD requested Law Enforcement Mutual Aid and made a request to task State Civil Support to assess the Valley event for hazardous materials release levels. The EOC Director denied this request and recommended instead that LAPD and LAFD Haz-Mat Teams do an initial assessment of the area and report status first before calling for State resources. This mission request was given to the Operations Section for coordination.

Reports of an explosion under the City Hall East Bridge were received by EOC Management at 0940 hours. This information had been given to LAPD's RACR at 0755 hours. The Law Branch, within the Operations Section had been aware of this information since 0905 hours.

The EOC Director and Deputies requested a situation brief at 1000 hours and an Initial Situation Analysis Brief at 1100 hours.

As of 0940 hours, the Logistics Section reported that they had not received any resource requests. Some direct resource requests did finally come in from the Operations Section but were sent back to the Operations Section Coordinator for approval.

At 1000 hours, the Deputy Director (EMD) suggested that Temple St., directly in front of the EOC, be secured with additional armed security presence. This request was given to the EOC Coordination Section for assignment.

At 1025 hours, an Initial Situation Briefing was provided by the Situation Analysis Unit Leader for EOC Management, with information current and accurate as of 0915 hours. Information on the four incidents was provided, with 75 combined casualties reported. At the conclusion of this

meeting, the EOC Director provided a list of information needs and resource priorities to the Plans Section Coordinator.

At 1030 hours, a report was received that the Mayor was out of the country and that the Acting Mayor had a noon press conference scheduled.

At 1040 hours, the Acting Mayor declared a local emergency.

At 1100 hours, the Initial Situation Analysis Briefing began, led by the Plans Section Coordinator, complete with a briefing format and meeting agenda. Updated information was provided on each incident, including a list of all responding agencies, the location of evacuation and reunification sites, media staging areas, social media monitoring efforts and activation of the incident information help line

Among information noted was the Law Branch's request for the California National Guard to protect City Hall. This request was denied by the EOC Directors. Direction was given to all Section Coordinators that all requests for state or federal resources required approval of the EOC Directors. The EOC Directors also asked what the plan of action was for schools in and around the areas affected by the incidents and requested a report back on this issue.

At 1130 hours, at the conclusion of the Situation Analysis Briefing, the EOC Directors left the Management Room headed for the MCR to conduct an 'All-Hands' Briefing for all EOC staff.

At the conclusion of the 'All-Hands' EOC Briefing the exercise was terminated at 1200 hours.

II. EXERCISE SYNOPSIS

A. Initial Reports

Scenario #1 - West Bureau-LAPD

- LAX Police report of an explosion in the Baggage Claim Area of the Bradley Terminal at LAX.

- Gunmen wearing body armor firing on crowds in the passenger departure level of the Bradley Terminal. Armed with high powered weapons concealed in “carry-on” duffle style bags.

Scenario #2 - Valley Bureau-LAPD

- Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) was driven through gates and security measures of the Los Angeles Aqueduct Filtration Plant located near Balboa Blvd in the Northern San Fernando Valley, near the interchange of Highways 5, 14, and 210.
- Initial reports indicated that an explosion had occurred near storage tanks of placarded chemicals.
- Several DWP employees were injured as a result of the explosion. LAPD and LAFD were on scene with FD treating patients.

Scenario #3 - Central Bureau-LAPD

- Explosion occurred on North Main Street, just south of the cross walk between City Hall and City Hall East.
- Reports of pedestrians down on Main Street in the immediate vicinity of the blast down, with damaged vehicles blocking access for first responder vehicles.
- Bridge connecting City Hall to City Hall East completely destroyed by blast, with debris strewn across Main Street.
- Blast also destroyed bottom five floors on the west face of City Hall East.

Scenario #4 - South Bureau-LAPD

- Preliminary information received of a large explosion at Harbor Community College with reports of LASD Deputies down.
- Additional reports indicated between four and six gunmen, armed with semi-automatic handguns and assault rifles opened fire while moving across campus. Information from 911 indicated multiple victims down.

B. Major Exercise Developments (Follow-on Reports)

Scenario #1 - West Bureau-LAPD

- Additional reports received of additional gunmen firing on crowds in baggage claim areas of Terminals 3 & 4. Crowds fled through the terminals towards parking structure, where additional gunmen opened fire as well.
- Multiple fires reported, spreading quickly within Parking Structure 3, with vehicles on fire within the lower level.
- Several gunmen shot and killed by law enforcement. Others found dead from self-inflicted gunshot wounds. One gunman captured alive.
- Unconfirmed reports received of 21 deceased individuals, including four gunmen.
- Explosives teams swept all terminals & parking structures for additional explosive devices. Fires within Terminal 4 and Parking Structure 3 extinguished.
- Two gunmen identified as belonging to a radical homegrown terrorist organization with ties to international radical groups.
- Final victim tally: 32 victims deceased, 18 transported with life threatening injuries, 57 with serious, but non-life threatening injuries and 22 victims with minor injuries.
- Law enforcement reported approximately 275 uninjured witnesses staged in ballroom of the LAX Radisson Hotel needing to be interviewed.

Scenario #2 - Valley Bureau-LAPD

- Significant concerns for public health due to a large cloud of gas in the area spreading rapidly downwind.
- As a result of current weather conditions (*clear skies, winds at 18 mph out of the East-Northeast with potential afternoon gusts of 25 to 30 mph, forecasted humidity of 22%*).
- Need for shelter in place message for neighborhoods downwind a major incident objective.
- Seven DWP employees transported to hospital; one in serious but stable condition & six with minor injuries. Fires from explosion under control and gas cloud beginning to dissipate.
- Filtration plant put off-line and currently non-operational. Total damage undetermined during scenario. Unknown when plant will be back on- line.
- LAPD Valley units remain on-scene to begin conducting investigation. Most LAFD resources have cleared, with small contingent remaining to conduct mop up & overhaul operations.

Scenario #3 - Central Bureau-LAPD

- Commercial delivery truck, parked on North Main Street, just south of the cross walk between City Hall and City Hall East exploded shortly after uniformed delivery driver exited the vehicle and disappeared.
- Estimates include: 75 people deceased, 120 with serious injuries, 150 with mild injuries, and 28 people unaccounted for.

Scenario #4 - South Bureau-LAPD

- Further reports indicated that as students arrived for morning classes, a VBIED detonated at the east end of Parking Lot H near L Street on campus, immediately adjacent to the L.A.S.D. Community College Station.
- One gunman shot and killed by Sheriff Deputies. The remaining gunmen retreated into the College Child Care Facility, where they held five Child Care Center personnel hostage, along with 23 children, ranging in age between eight months and four years old.
- No survivors found inside Campus Police Station, which was occupied by LASD Watch Commander, two Deputies and two civilian staff at incident initiation.
- Reports indicate 56 victims shot on campus, with 7 deceased on scene and an additional 18 with critical life threatening injuries. Other victims received non-life threatening injuries.
- Gunmen remain barricaded in the Child Development Center with adult and child hostages.

C. Capabilities Exercised

The capabilities selected for the EOC Functional Meta-Event Exercise provided the foundation for development of the exercise objectives and scenario. The purpose of this exercise was to measure and validate performance of the identified target capabilities and their associated critical tasks. Capabilities selected were:

- EOC Management
- Communications
- Public Information Management

D. Objectives

This exercise was focused on the following objectives:

- Management/Coordination by EOC Leadership
- Assignment and Implementation of Standing EOC Objectives
- Progression of EOC Planning Process
- Development of Situational Awareness
- Information Management and Flow
- Public Information Management

III. EXERCISE FINDINGS

The main purpose of the 2011 City of Los Angeles EOC Exercise was to assess initial response procedures for information collection, information sharing and decision making within the EOC, as well as to validate EOC Training conducted to date, and identify where planning, training or equipment gaps might exist.

As the exercise began, initial efforts at information sharing were problematic. In one example, as initial exercise information was injected into RACR, it was quickly noted that this information, inputted into LAPD's WebEOC portal, was not getting to the EMD Duty Officer. This initial information was critical for the prompt activation of the EOC and to ensure the timely start of the exercise. This information coordination issue was caused by EMD not having access to RACR WebEOC portal. RACR personnel presumed EMD had access to their WebEOC portal, when in fact, due to previous security concerns, that access had not been granted to EMD. In light of this issue, the Exercise Senior Controller prompted the EMD Duty Officer to initiate the EOC activation process without them having received any initial scenario information at all. This was done so that the exercise would not fall behind schedule. Once the EOC was activated, this communication node was quickly strengthened utilizing runners from RACR, who communicated scenario information directly to the RACR Unit, established within the Law Branch of the Operations Section.

Information gathering and exercise effectiveness were hindered by the lack of exercise media reports, video, audio and/or scenario injects. Availability of these exercise tools could have including increased incident information gathering capability and had a potentially greater impact on timely decision-making.

EOC Evaluators commented positively on the information collection, vetting and management briefings that were conducted throughout the initial, 'Reactive Phase', of this exercise. Also noted was the decisiveness of EOC Management as critical information came to them and when critical decisions needed to be made and conveyed to the EOC organization. Also, EMD staff, particularly the Plans Section Deputy Coordinator, assisted greatly in ensuring that the EOC Coordination Process, which is critical to the operational success of the City of Los Angeles EOC, was conducted and maintained throughout the activation.

Compared to previous exercises, especially at the Branch Director and Unit Leader levels of the EOC organization, exercise participants were much more engaged in this exercise. This exercise was designed specifically to ensure that each of the 96 EOC positions activated had at least three to five initial scenario specific tasks or duties they had to carry out upon activating their position. These initial obligatory activities ensured that each position was already carrying out functions and duties as scenario specific information was still being received within the EOC. Section Coordinators and their Deputies were called on to determine: (1) what information needed to be sent either to other Branches/Units within their Section, or to another Section, and (2) what information would be included in the Management briefing report or sent directly to the Management Section for their immediate attention.

A. Practices to Sustain

The following bulleted list represents practices EOC Evaluators observed that they felt were best-practices that should be sustained:

- Each work station had a well thought out Job Aid/Checklist for the participant. Those participants who reviewed their position checklists did well in understanding their assigned EOC responsibilities.
- The EOC Director was very clear on his expectations and how the EOC would function.
- At the Hasty Management Briefing, the EOC Director and Deputy EOC Director (EMD) addressed the resource ordering process to be used, designating the EOC to control ordering of all non-law or fire resources.
- Excellent direction and leadership was exhibited by the EOC Director at the Management requested briefings and throughout the exercise time period.
- EOC Management clearly recognized the difference between incident management and the role of coordination and incident support in the EOC. Though discussions “went tactical” on occasion, Management remained “in their lanes” of responsibility. These discussions helped Management to predict potential resource needs and prepare for such orders from DOCs.
- At one point the Law Branch, on their own initiative, made a direct request to the CA State National Guard for assets to protect City Hall. The EOC Director overrode this request when notified and reminded the Law Branch Director to run those types of requests through the EOC Director(s) for approval.
- The Public Information component within the Management Section was well managed. The need for a Joint Information

System to control the release of information was recognized and accepted by all participating Departments. For example, LAWA vetted their Twitter and Facebook messages through the EOC PIO's prior to releasing any information. They provided information, briefing notes, press conference locations, times, and facilitated a coordinated public information strategy.

- EMD Staff provided support for participants who were not familiar with the facility, equipment and processes used in the EOC. They also shepherded high ranking officials through their roles, and ensured that the established EOC processes were implemented.
- The initial Situation Briefing for Management at 0925 hours brought together key personnel with clear expectations and a report format that ultimately worked very well.
- The Liaison Officer was effective in determining necessary Agency Representatives, formally requesting them, and contacting and communicating with them with the EOC Director's approval.
- Management recognized the need for more involvement and input from the LAX PD Agency Representative. This individual was assigned to the Law Branch rather than staying assigned to the Liaison Officer for coordination.
- The DOCs at RACR, LAWA's ARCC and Agency Representatives (DWP, POLA, LASD and LACoOEM) supported the City EOC effort and shared exercise information in accordance with established protocols.
- The Planning Section and Situation Analysis Unit were very focused on ensuring the proper collection, analysis, and dissemination of incident information and did an outstanding job.
- The EOC Coordination process effectively addressed the issues of authority and responsibilities beyond the City of Los Angeles, and included consideration of County (Operational Area) coordination roles under SEMS, as well as regional, State, and Federal responsibilities. Management addressed issues at these levels early and often.
- EOC Management continuously addressed the need for information from other locations to determine the scope and magnitude of the attacks. This was an excellent concept in that resource availability would certainly be affected if there were multiple attacks in multiple jurisdictions.
- The final Situational Briefing for Management included outstanding reports from the Operations, Logistics and Finance Section Coordinators. In a real incident there is no doubt that participants would find their battle rhythm within the first 4-6 hours and the EOC would operate smoothly and successfully.

- EOC Management discussed their role for interfacing with City political leadership, and assessed the very important need to provide security and safety for the Mayor and other key leaders.

B. Areas Requiring Improvement

The following bulleted list represents challenges EOC Evaluators observed that they felt should be documented, with an improvement plan in place to improve operations where noted in the Appendix A - Improvement Plan:

- The potential for communications and coordination issues arising between EMD and RACR, during the initial notification phase was noted as a potential node of failure during exercise development. At the outset of the exercise scenario, when the EOC Organization was in critical need of good situational information, the documented notification and communications protocols between RACR and EMD that were in place, but not fully operational, as well as the lack of access to department-specific incident management software 'screens', bottle-necked and thus slowed the information gathering process considerably. As a direct result there were some injects that were lost in the process and because of this EOC responders were limited in knowing where response coordination was critically needed.
- Many exercise participants did not review or use the available Checklists and Job Aids made available. One Evaluator noted that several individuals in the EOC Logistics and Finance/Administration Sections did not realize that they had checklists to assist them, did not understand how they were expected to respond to an 'exercise inject' (and that there was an expectation the 'exercise inject' and associated response needed to be logged), and that they were expected to use WebEOC to log actions taken.
- The Initial Situation Briefing with EOC Management and Coordination Staff personnel began somewhat tentatively, and with no recognizable agenda. Lacking a formal agenda for this initial meeting, the EOC Director took over this meeting with his own agenda. The EOC Director did ultimately direct the Plans Section Coordinator to develop a formal meeting agenda and schedule.
- There was no reference to the assignment of EOC Standing Objectives within the Management Section during either the Hasty Management Meeting or the Initial Situation Briefing. As well, there was no direct reference to use of the EOC Coordination P or the attendant planning process within the Management Section, though most EOC Standing

Objectives were initiated and carried out by the appropriate EOC Sections.

- As the EOC Director and Deputy EOC Director (EMD) addressed the resource ordering process during the Initial Situation Briefing held at 0925 hours, the discussion did not reconcile the fire and law enforcement mutual aid process and where those orders would be processed, either within the EOC or by the activated LAPD DOC or LAFD DOC.
- Initial communication between the Main Coordination Room floor and the Management Room was marginal at best. Several examples were noted, including an incident at City Hall that was known to the Operation's Section Law Branch at 0905 hours, yet Management was not notified until 0940 hours. This communications gap in the EOC was significant.
- While in a real incident of this type, national and local media would have been providing media information to enhance situational awareness, the lack of this aspect hindered EOC Management's ability to more quickly and effectively begin to gain situational awareness and develop a common operating picture.
- The Operations Section Coordinators information sharing within that Section was not very effective. Over an hour after the EOC activation, one of that Section's Branch Directors had to ask for general information on the scenario. Again, the lack of exercise media information hindered this process, in that the EOC personnel would be accessing news media (TV and radio) reports en route to and within in the EOC. That deficiency being noted, it was clear that the Operations Section Coordinator had not ensured a good common operating picture within his Section.
- EOC Responders were not provided with an accurate and timely incoming brief. EOC Management and Coordination Staff met informally in the corner of the Main Coordination Room at 0840 hours. Most other EOC responders were not well informed as a result of this hasty discussion, though Management did direct Section Coordinators to brief their subordinates, rather than conducting a quick "All-Hands" brief from the Management Team. One result was the aforementioned Operations Section Branch Director did not know the situation an hour into the exercise. The same way Standing Objectives are already established, many key points and directives could be addressed through a basic

initial and generic briefing outline, i.e., *'Use Your Checklist, Recognize and Assign Standing Objectives, Use the EOC Coordination P & EOC Planning Process'*. This type of an "All-Hands" initial brief by EOC Management could direct participants new to the EOC to make use of these available Job Aids.

- Due to the lack of EOC connectivity between EMD and RACR, EOC Management contacted RACR directly when they couldn't initially get timely incident information from the Operations Section Coordinator. This was a problem for both Management and the Operations Section Coordinator, hindering the ability to create a common operating picture within the EOC, and for providing information to City Executive Leadership, for City Family and the public.
- LAFD personnel assigned to the Fire Branch, with the Operations Section, seemed completely unaware of their Branch responsibilities and had to be coached with Just-in-Time training by knowledgeable LAFD personnel as the EOC began to ramp up. This need for immediate Just-in-Time training caused the Branch Director to miss initial information gathering discussions within the Operations Section, causing important incident information not be shared and reported to EOC Management in a timelier manner.
- LAFD's Fire Metro did not directly or indirectly establish communication with the EOC, utilizing the Fire Branch, within the Operations Section. The LAFD DOC function of Fire Metro was not activated and did not participate in this exercise.
- Other than the initial meeting held in the front of the Main Coordination Room specifically for EOC Management and Section Coordinators and the "All-hands" briefing for all EOC Staff held near the end of the exercise, EOC Management remained in the management room throughout the exercise. Had they gotten out on the floor more often, communication could have been better and they may have been better able to assess how EOC Operations were being carried out.
- Many EOC Staff still have little to no understanding about how an EOC operates. Some had not received EOC training and were unaware of the information that would be expected from their position, and what information they produced that was necessary for other EOC staff to complete their assignment. It was also noted that some staff members did not know how to use available checklists. This lack of readiness caused a slowing of the transference of information and the bogging-

down of Section activity, and thereby, delayed timely contributions to EOC operations. To ensure efficient operation in the EOC, staff requires better training and preparation.

IV. CONCLUSION

The 2011 City of Los Angeles EOC Exercise was an opportunity to validate and reaffirm EOC processes developed and revised over the last several years and to measure the operational readiness of EOC Responders.

The lack of training of many of the key EOC responders on the responsibilities of their specific position was noted by all exercise evaluators. Though Just-In-Time training was conducted by EMD staff, working in designated positions at EOC activation, it was made clear that many individuals (specifically among EOC Coordination Staff) had not yet received any of the 20 hours of EOC training that EMD has determined is required to ensure basic competence within the EOC. It was also clearly demonstrated that attendance at this same training by the EOC Director from LAPD and the Deputy EOC Director from LAFD increased their ability to leverage the capabilities of the EOC organization they managed in a more informed and focused manner.

The lack of familiarity with WebEOC was also documented by both Evaluators and EOC responders, which clearly had an impact on both the information gathering and information sharing processes being exercised. Evaluators also suggested that having scribes for key EOC positions that could focus on capturing key actions of Section Coordinators and Deputies during the initial phase of the EOC activation could greatly assist in the timely capture of initial incident response actions.

Further EOC training and exercises opportunities such as this will continue to ensure that, when activated, the EOC will function effectively using our established process and procedures and staffed by trained, focused EOC responders to ensure success.

V. IMPROVEMENT PLAN MATRIX

See Appendix A

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

This Improvement Plan Matrix has been developed specifically for the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department as a result of the 2011 EOC Functional Exercise conducted on December 7, 2011.

Capability: Communications

Issue: At exercise outset, when the EOC Organization needed critical situational information, the lack of WebEOC compatibility between RACR and EMD slowed the information gathering process considerably. As a direct result EOC responders were limited understanding all available information.

Recommendation: Ensure EMD's access to LAPD's RACR WebEOC Boards that ensures effective interaction and critical information sharing between EMD and LAPD's RACR during EOC activations.

Corrective Action Description: EMD to work with LAPD and the Information Technology Agency to ensure that access to RACR WebEOC Boards is in place. The technical work necessary has been completed. Further written procedures needs to be finalized to ensure a true operational capability.

Capability Element: Planning

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD Operations Division & LAPD RACR

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman & Officer in Command LAPD RACR

Start Date: 15 December 2011

Completion Date: Technical (1 March 2012). Procedural (pending)

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: Communications

Issue: Initial Communications between the Main Coordination Room floor and the Management Room was marginal at best. In one example, major information regarding a then unreported incident that was known to the Operations Section-Law Branch at 0905hrs. was not received by EOC Management until 0940hrs.

Recommendation: All EOC responders need to understand how to effectively prioritize information received to ensure high priority information is pushed to EOC management immediately upon receipt.

Corrective Action Description: Include message prioritization and triage as a training objective within both the EOC supervisor's responsibilities and the coordination planning phases of the existing EOC 301 Training Course.

Capability Element: Training

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD EOC Task Force & Operations Division

Agency Point of Contact: – Rob Freeman

Start Date: 10 January 2012

Completion Date: On-going component of EOC-301 Training Course

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: Communications

Issue: LAFD's Metro Fire did not directly or indirectly establish communication with the EOC Fire Branch. The LAFD DOC function of Metro Fire was not activated and did not participate in this exercise.

Recommendation: Ensure that communications channels between Metro Fire and the EOC are in place, operational and effective during EOC activations.

Corrective Action Description: Continue working with LAFD to integrate their Metro Fire and DOC operations into the communications and information gathering and sharing processes of the EOC, once activated.

Capability Element: Planning

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD Operations Division & LAFD

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman

Start Date: 15 December 2011

Completion Date: On-going

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: Many exercise participants did not review or use the available Checklists and Job Aids made available. One Evaluator noted that several individuals in the EOC Logistics and Finance/Administration Sections did not realize that they had checklists to assist them; did not understand how they were expected to respond to an 'exercise inject', that there was an expectation that the 'exercise inject' and associated response needed to be logged; and that they were expected to use WebEOC to log their actions taken.

Recommendation: Many key points and directives necessary for EOC responders to be aware and make use of could also be addressed through a basic initial and generic briefing outline given during the initial phase of the EOC's activation and during the beginning of each EOC Operational Period. This type of an "All-Hands" initial briefing by EOC Management could direct any participants new to the EOC to make use of available Job Aids, such as the position checklists and other job aids.

Corrective Action Description: Continue, formalize and document the Just-in-Time training being provided by EMD personnel for EOC responders during the initial phase of the EOC's activation. As well, develop an initial, 'All-Hands' Briefing format for EOC Management (*EOC Coordinator*) to utilize for briefing in-coming EOC responders.

Capability Element: Planning

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD Operations Division

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman

Start Date: 1 May 2012

Completion Date: 1 October 2012

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: The Initial Situation Briefing with EOC Management & Coordination Staff personnel occurred with no recognizable agenda. Lacking a formal agenda for this initial meeting, the EOC Director took over this meeting with his own agenda. As there is currently no “Initial Situation Briefing” identified as part of the EOC’s Coordination Process, the EOC Director did ultimately direct the Plans Section Coordinator to develop a formal meeting agenda and schedule for upcoming meetings. Agendas for the already identified meetings in the EOC Coordination Process (Situational Analysis, Coordination & Planning Meetings and the Operations Briefing), already exist.

Recommendation: Ensure that the intent of any unplanned meeting(s) requested by EOC Management early-on during the initial dynamic phase of EOC response is clearly understood and known to all participants.

Corrective Action Description: Create a standardized meeting agenda format for unscheduled meetings, focused on the setting of Management’s Intent and initial priorities.

Capability Element: Planning

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD EOC Task Force & Operations Division

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman

Start Date: 1 May 2012

Completion Date: 1 October 2012

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: There was no observation regarding the assignment of EOC Standing Objectives within the Management Section during either the Hasty Management Meeting (0840hrs.) or the Initial Situation Briefing (0925hrs.). As well, there was no direct reference to use of the EOC Coordination P or the attendant planning process within the Management Section, though most EOC Standing Objectives were initiated and carried out by the appropriate EOC Sections.

Recommendation: The assignment of EOC Standing Objectives should be pre-identified before an incident begins, with each Standing Objective's assignment documented on all Job-Aids. As well, confirmation that Standing Objectives have been assigned should be part of a standardized agenda for any initial or update meetings occurring before the identified Situation Analysis Briefing.

Corrective Action Description: Document the process of confirming Standing Objectives assignments as part of the EOC Director's and EOC Coordinator's procedural checklist.

Capability Element: Training

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD EOC Task Force & Operations Division

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman

Start Date: 1 May 2012

Completion Date: 1 October 2012

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: During Initial Situation Briefing at 0925hrs, as EOC Management addressed the resource ordering process, the discussion did not reconcile the fire and law enforcement mutual-aid process and where those orders would be processed, either within the EOC or by the activated LAPD DOC or LAFD DOC.

Recommendation: The resources ordering process specific to law and fire should be confirmed and documented as part of initial decision-making coming out of any initial meetings by management.

Corrective Action Description: Determination of the resource-ordering process for both law and fire should be a component of an agenda to be developed for management for any initial meetings established by EOC Management.

Capability Element: Planning

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD Operations Division

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman

Start Date: 1 May 2102

Completion Date: 1 October 2012

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: Information sharing within the Operations Section was not very effective. Over an hour after EOC activation, one of the Section's Branch Directors still had no general information on the incidents occurring. A process for ensuring that a good 'Common Operating Picture' was being developed was not evident within this Section.

Recommendation: The need for an accurate 'Common Operating Picture' within the EOC Sections, leading to the same condition throughout the EOC, is critical. Ensuring that Section Coordinators are sharing information within their respective Sections is the key to achieving this common picture of the incident response. With their role as the eyes and ears of the EOC, the Operations Section must communicate incident information well within the Section to ensure that information flows, where needed, within the EOC. Ensuring that the Operations Section Coordinator and Deputy are conducting regular meetings with the Branch Directors focused on confirming and sharing incident information is foundational to the creation of the 'Common Operating Picture' within the EOC.

Corrective Action Description: Ensure that a good 'Common Operating Picture' is established in the EOC by placing this requirement within the Position Checklists of all Branch Directors and the Operations Section Coordinator and Deputy. As well, ensure that this tasking is a focus of all EOC training provided for these positions.

Capability Element: Planning & Training

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD Operations Division

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman

Start Date: 1 May 2012

Completion Date: 1 Oct. 2012

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: EOC Responders were not provided with an accurate and timely incoming incident briefing. EOC Management and Coordination Staff met informally just after EOC activation. Most other EOC responders were not well informed as a result of this hasty discussion. One result was the aforementioned Operations Section Branch Director who didn't know key incident specific information an hour into the exercise.

Recommendation: Though Management did direct Section Coordinators to brief their subordinates, this process was not handled effectively.

Corrective Action Description: Ensure that an initial 'All-Hands' Briefing is conducted with a set agenda as soon after EOC activation as is practicable to ensure the entire EOC has a clear understanding of the situation occurring, as early as possible.

Capability Element: Planning and Training

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD Operations Division

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman

Start Date: 1 May 2012

Completion Date: 1 Oct. 2012

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: Early on, EOC Management contacted LAPD's RACR directly when they couldn't initially get timely incident information from the Operations Section, due primarily to the lack of EOC connectivity between EMD and RACR noted earlier. This was a problem for both Management and the Operations Section Coordinator, exacerbating the ability to create a common operating picture within the EOC, and provide information to City Leadership, City Family and the public.

Recommendation: Understanding that EOC Directors, staffed by individuals from agency with primary responsibility for incident response, will likely make direct contact with their Department's activated DOCs as well as Incident Commanders in the field, a protocol for aligning this information gathering process into the EOC's information gathering function needs to be established. Doing so will reduce the duplicative and potentially conflicting information requests coming from the EOC.

Corrective Action Description: Establish a protocol for ensuring information gathered for the EOC from all sources are combined into the information gathering process established through the Coordination Planning for the EOC.

Capability Element: Planning

Primary Responsible Agency: EMD Operations Division

Agency Point of Contact: Rob Freeman

Start Date: 1 May 2012

Completion Date: Open

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: Personnel assigned to the Fire Branch, with the Operations Section, appeared to be unprepared for and unaware of their Branch responsibilities and needed to be coached with Just-in-Time training by LAFD personnel with knowledge of EOC operations. This need for immediate Just-in-Time training caused the Branch Director to miss initial information gathering discussions occurring within the Operations Section, causing important incident information to not be shared within the EOC nor reported to EOC Management expeditiously.

Recommendation: LAFD personnel designated to perform duties in the Fire Branch, with the Operations Section, should be better trained and aware of what their Unit or Branch duties. This training will better ensure that critical time-sensitive Fire/EMS incident and resource information is reported to EOC Management and other Operations Branches and EOC Sections in a timelier manner.

Corrective Action Description: Fire personnel assigned to this Branch need to attend the 20 hours of EOC training necessary to achieve an 'Awareness Level' understanding of the EOC and their position responsibilities.

Capability Element: Training

Primary Responsible Agency: LAFD

Agency Point of Contact: Chief Michael Little

Start Date: 1 January 2012

Completion Date: Open

APPENDIX A

2011 EOC FUNCTIONAL META-EVENT EXERCISE IMPROVEMENT PLAN

Capability: EOC Management

Issue: Many EOC Staff still had little understanding about how an EOC operates. Some had not received EOC training and were unaware of the information that would be expected from their position, and what information they produced that was necessary for other EOC staff to complete their assignments. It was also noted that some staff members did not know how to use available checklists. This lack of readiness impeded the transferring of information and the Section activities, and thereby, delayed timely contributions to EOC operations.

Recommendation: To ensure efficient operations within the EOC, responding staff requires better preparation. While 20 hours of EOC training is available and occurs on a regular basis, not all City personnel likely to be assigned to the EOC is attending this training. City Depts. will need to ensure that EOC training for their likely responders is a key component of their Dept. emergency preparedness planning.

Corrective Action Description: Ensure all potential responders who could be sent to the EOC by their respective departments have received 20 hours of EOC training made available.

Capability Element: Training

Primary Responsible Agency: City Departments

Agency Point of Contact: City Department Leadership and Emergency Managers

Start Date: Specific training on EOC operations, procedures and how to carry out key position responsibilities has been available since July 2010.

Completion Date: Open