

**AGENDA**  
**City of Los Angeles**  
**EMERGENCY OPERATIONS BOARD**

**SPECIAL MEETING**

*Wednesday, May 25, 2022*  
*3:00 P.M.*

In accordance with Government Code Section 54953, subsections (e)(1) and (e)(3), and in light of the State of Emergency originally proclaimed by the Governor on March 4, 2020 relating to COVID-19 and ongoing concerns that meeting in person would present imminent risks to the health or safety of attendees, and/or that the State of Emergency continues to directly impact the ability of members to meet safely in person, the May 25, 2022 meeting of the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) will be conducted entirely telephonically. EOB members and staff will also have access to video teleconferencing capabilities. Until further notice, meetings will not be conducted at the EOB Boardroom, 500 E. Temple Street, Los Angeles, CA 90012.

Members of the public can listen to the meeting via telephone and are invited to address the EOB on any item on the agenda prior to action by the Board on that specific item by calling (312) 626-6799. Public participants will be asked for a meeting ID, and should enter 89721438394 followed by the # (pound sign). Participants should then press # (pound sign) again to continue. Participants wishing to provide public comment should press \*9 and will be called on by the meeting moderator (EOB Executive Assistant).

Public comment will be limited to two (2) minutes per individual for each item addressed, unless there are more than ten (10) comment requests for each item, in which case the Board Chair may limit public comment to one (1) minute per individual. Time cannot be ceded to another speaker, and an individual may speak only once during any individual agenda item. Only those who are in the queue when the Board Chair begins public comment on a specific agenda item, or the General Public Comment item will be allowed to speak on that item.

*NOTE: Pursuant to Government Code Section 54954.3(b) the legislative body of a local agency may adopt reasonable regulations, including, but not limited to, regulations limiting the total amount of time allocated for public testimony on particular issues and for each individual speaker.*

It is requested that individuals who require the services of a translator contact the Executive Assistant to the Board at (213) 484-4815 no later than the day preceding the meeting. Whenever possible, a translator will be provided.

Sign language interpreters, assistive listening devices, or other auxiliary aids and/or services may be provided upon request. To ensure availability, you are advised to make your request at least 72 hours prior to the meeting you wish to attend.

Notice to Paid Representatives

If you are compensated to monitor, attend, or speak at this meeting, City law may require you to register as a lobbyist and report your activity. See Los Angeles Municipal Code §§ 48.01 et seq. More information is available at [ethics.lacity.org/lobbying](http://ethics.lacity.org/lobbying). For assistance, please contact the Ethics Commission at (213) 978-1960 or [ethics.commission@lacity.org](mailto:ethics.commission@lacity.org).

*NOTE: The meeting is digitally recorded.*

- I. **Declaration of Quorum; Instructions Regarding Virtual Meeting Format; Approval of March 10, April 1 and April 27 Meeting Minutes.**
- II. **Action Items**
  - A. **Determination whether meeting in person presents imminent risk to the health and safety of attendees and continues to directly impact the ability of Board members to meet safely in person because of the continuing State of Emergency related to the Covid-19 pandemic, and possible Board action, pursuant to Government Code Sections 54953(e)(1)(B)-(C), and (e)(3)(A) and (B)(i) - Carol Parks**
  - B. **Approval of the Los Angeles Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack (CCTA) Exercise Series Functional Exercise After Action Report (AAR) - Gary Singer**
- III. **Information Items**
  - A. **COVID-19 Update**
    1. EOC Activation & COVID Data Overview - Carol Parks & Carmina De Santiago
    2. COVID-19 Workplace Safety Standards Update - Paula Dayes
  - B. **Long-Term Recovery Group Update**
    1. 27<sup>th</sup> Street Incident - Gary Singer
  - C. **Planned Events**
    1. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Drill and Senior Leadership Seminar (5/24 & 5/26) - Gary Singer
    2. Summit of the Americas (6/6 - 6/10) - Crisanta Gonzalez
  - D. **EOC Technology Upgrades - Carol Parks**

**IV. General Public Comment**

**V. Presentations (as requested)**

**VI. Adjournment**

# AFTER-ACTION REPORT



## LOS ANGELES EOC COMPLEX COORDINATED TERRORIST ATTACK EXERCISE SERIES

### Functional Exercise

April 21, 2022

*The After-Action Report/Improvement Plan (AAR/IP) aligns exercise objectives with preparedness doctrine to include the National Preparedness Goal and related frameworks and guidance. Exercise information required for preparedness reporting and trend analysis is included; users are encouraged to add additional sections as needed to support their own organizational needs.*

This page is intentionally left blank.



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

<b>Exercise Overview.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Analysis of Core Capabilities.....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Objective 1.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Core Capability: Operational Coordination.....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Objective 2.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Core Capability: Situational Assessment.....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Core Capability: Intelligence and Information Sharing.....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Objective 3.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Core Capability: Logistics and Supply Chain Management.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Objective 4.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Core Capability: Public Information and Warning.....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Appendix A: Improvement Plan.....</b>	<b>A-1</b>
<b>Appendix B: Exercise Participants.....</b>	<b>B-1</b>
<b>Appendix C: Participant Feedback.....</b>	<b>C-1</b>
<b>Part I: Recommendations and Corrective Actions.....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Part II: Assessment of Exercise Design and Conduct.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Part III: Participant Feedback.....</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Appendix D: Acronym List.....</b>	<b>D-1</b>



This page intentionally left blank.



## EXERCISE OVERVIEW

<b>Exercise Name</b>	Los Angeles EOC Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Functional Exercise
<b>Exercise Dates</b>	Thursday, March 17, 2022, 0800-1600
<b>Scope</b>	FE focused on the following the vertical and horizontal coordination required by the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the horizontal coordination and communication among the EOCs and relevant DOCs using both primary and backup communication systems.
<b>Mission Area(s)</b>	Response
<b>Core Capabilities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Operational Coordination</li><li>Situational Assessment</li><li>Logistics and Supply Chain Management</li><li>Intelligence and Information Sharing</li><li>Public Information and Warning</li></ul>
<b>Objectives</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Evaluate the horizontal and vertical operational coordination between the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, City of Long Beach EOCs, associated DOCs, and other agencies responding to a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring within the Los Angeles County Operational Area.</li><li>Evaluate the process of and ability of participating agencies to gain and maintain situational awareness and share a common operating picture in response to a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring with Los Angeles County.</li><li>Evaluate the ability of participating EOCs and DOCs to support the field response and community needs following a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring within Los Angeles County.</li><li>Evaluate the participating EOCs' ability to utilize the JIS to coordinate and provide accurate, accessible, and timely public information and warning.</li></ul>
<b>Threat or Hazard</b>	Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack
<b>Scenario</b>	Homegrown violent extremists (HVE) carry out coordinated attacks targeting densely populated areas in LA City, Pasadena, Long Beach, and the unincorporated LA County area.
<b>Sponsor</b>	City of Los Angeles
<b>Participating Organizations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><b>See Appendix B</b> for a full list of participants.</li></ul>





Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise

Point of Contact

Gary Singer, Exercise Director  
City of Los Angeles, Emergency Management Department  
(213) 484-4803  
[gary.singer@lacity.org](mailto:gary.singer@lacity.org)

Jim Bailey, Senior Controller  
SenseMakers LLC  
(760) 521-5087  
[jim@sensemakersllc.com](mailto:jim@sensemakersllc.com)



## ANALYSIS OF CORE CAPABILITIES

Aligning exercise objectives and core capabilities provides a consistent taxonomy for evaluation that transcends individual exercises to support preparedness reporting and trend analysis. Table 1 includes the exercise objectives, aligned core capabilities, and performance ratings for each core capability as observed during the exercise and determined by the evaluation team.

Objective	Core Capability	Performed without Challenges (P)	Performed with Some Challenges (S)	Performed with Major Challenges (M)	Unable to be Performed (U)
Evaluate the horizontal and vertical operational coordination between the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, City of Pasadena EOCs, associated DOCs, and other agencies responding to a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring within Los Angeles County Operational Area.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Operational Coordination</li> </ul>		S		
Evaluate the process of and ability of participating agencies to gain and maintain situational awareness and share a common operating picture in response to a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring with Los Angeles County.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Situational Assessment</li> <li>▪ Intelligence and Information Sharing</li> </ul>		S		
Evaluate the ability of participating EOCs and DOCs to support the field response and community needs following a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring within Los Angeles County.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Logistics and Supply Chain Management</li> </ul>		S		



Objective	Core Capability	Performed without Challenges (P)	Performed with Some Challenges (S)	Performed with Major Challenges (M)	Unable to be Performed (U)
Evaluate the participating EOCs ability to utilize the JIS to coordinate and provide accurate, accessible, and timely public information and warning.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Public Information and Warning</li> </ul>		S		
<p><b>Ratings Definitions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Performed without Challenges (P): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.</li> <li>• Performed with Some Challenges (S): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s) and did not negatively impact the performance of other activities. Performance of this activity did not contribute to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers, and it was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws. However, opportunities to enhance effectiveness and/or efficiency were identified.</li> <li>• Performed with Major Challenges (M): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were completed in a manner that achieved the objective(s), but some or all of the following were observed: demonstrated performance had a negative impact on the performance of other activities; contributed to additional health and/or safety risks for the public or for emergency workers; and/or was not conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, procedures, regulations, and laws.</li> <li>• Unable to be Performed (U): The targets and critical tasks associated with the core capability were not performed in a manner that achieved the objective(s).</li> </ul>					

**Table 1. Summary of Core Capability Performance**

The following sections provide an overview of the performance related to each exercise objective and associated core capability, highlighting strengths and areas for improvement.



## **Objective 1: Evaluate the horizontal and vertical operational coordination between the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, City of Pasadena EOCs, associated DOCs, and other agencies responding to a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring within Los Angeles County Operational Area.**

The strengths and areas for improvement for each core capability aligned to this objective are described in this section.

### **Core Capability: Operational Coordination**

#### **Strengths**

The *Partial* capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

**Strength 1:** Horizontal communication with LA City Department Operations Centers (DOCs) was established early on with good points of communication and excellent information flow. Evaluators observed good information exchange between DOCs and the EOC on a regular basis.

**Strength 2:** The LA City EOC held conference calls in the management room facilitated by the Planning Section Coordinator. These calls followed a structured format led by the PSC and were conducted in an efficient and straight forward manner.

**Strength 3:** The JRIC had an Intelligence Officer embedded within the Management Section of the LA City EOC; this provided the EOC Directors with direct access to the JRIC. Conference calls were held with the JRIC and the embedded JRIC Intelligence Officer as well as the assistants for the PD and FD EOC Directors and the Law Branch Investigations Unit Leader.

**Strength 4:** City of Long Beach exercise participants were able to quickly familiarize themselves with the VEOCI system and input/respond to requests throughout the exercise.

**Strength 5:** City of Long Beach exercise participants were able to coordinate with outside agencies throughout the exercise using established communication channels.

**Strength 6:** The LA County OA EOC information sharing process within their EOC was effective in establishing an internal COP among their EOC personnel.

**Strength 7:** The LA County OA EOC Operations Section, Law Branch and the JRIC AREP were very effective in maintaining communication with the JRIC and other OA law enforcement agencies. In coordination with the FBI AREP sitting in the LA County OA EOC, they maintained communication and conducted analysis on incoming intelligence. This was done via phone calls and conference calls with other OA jurisdiction EOC and DOC law enforcement as the sequence of incidents unfolded across the OA. Based on FBI parameters, the events were not identified as “domestic terrorism,” but they were identified as connected.

**Strength 8:** The LA County OA EOC does recognize its role as the jurisdiction’s link to state government authorities and resources and took action to achieve this task. Early on they made reporting notifications to the State and placed a resource request for a CalOES AREP to respond to the LA County OA EOC.

**Strength 9:** The LA County OA EOC did identify and coordinate with resources outside the traditional fire and law mutual aid systems for the benefit of OA jurisdictions. In the exercise play there was only one



request to trigger this task. This was the identification of a need for a DMORT team and efforts to coordinate assistance to the OA for fatality management.

**Strength 10:** LA County OA EOC personnel were familiar with and understood what reporting information should be entered into OARRS. The situation report and resource order boards were both utilized. Post-exercise interviews attribute this strength to the seasoned staff that have two years of COVID-19 EOC activation and other real-world events.

**Strength 11:** The LA County OA EOC personnel, based on discussions and observed actions, demonstrated they understand what should be logged into OARRS. They encountered no difficulty in utilizing the SitRep and Resource Management boards used in the LA County OA EOC process and procedures.

**Strength 12:** The LA County OA EOC provided OA EOC, LA City EOC, and Long Beach EOC activation notifications to the JRIC.

**Strength 13:** The LA County OA EOC requested and provided a seat in the EOC to the JRIC AREP in support of intelligence gathering and analysis. The JRIC AREP was assigned to the LA County OA EOC Operations Section and worked closely with the Law Branch. Intelligence gathering and analysis was further supported by including an FBI AREP in the LA County OA EOC.

**Strength 14:** The JRIC shared appropriate information with the LA County OA EOC Operations Section, Law Branch.

**Strength 15:** The LA County OA EOC provided the JRIC AREP with a seat assignment in the appropriate EOC section. The JRIC AREP was included in information sharing across the sections. The LA County OA EOC Operations Section, Law Branch worked closely with the JRIC AREP analyzing incoming intelligence from the JRIC and other OA jurisdiction law enforcement agencies.

**Strength 16:** The JRIC representative established and maintained strong communications with the JRIC throughout the Operational Period, sharing OA EOC information and acquiring intelligence as events unfolded. The OA EOC shared situation updates with the JRIC AREP through the EOC Operations Section, Law Branch.

**Strength 17:** The LA City EOC Operations Section Coordinator did an excellent job of explaining the EOC's battle rhythm and objectives. Communication between the Coordinator and the Section was excellent throughout the exercise.

**Strength 18:** The LA City EOC Planning and Intelligence Coordinator identified the plans and procedures available to assist EOC operations during the initial briefing.

**Strength 19:** LAPD EOC reps met with LAPD DOC personnel to compare notes and ensure a common operational understanding of the incident.

### Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

**Area for Improvement 1.1:** Los Angeles EOC did not maintain horizontal communication with other impacted jurisdictional EOCs.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide



**Analysis:** During the initial Management and General Staff meeting in the management room, the EOC Directors wanted to know which EOCs were open, Planning and Intelligence (P&I) was able to ascertain and identified them on a situation board in the management room. Although this is a strength, follow through could be improved. The P&I Section reached out to the Pasadena and Long Beach EOCs and established horizontal lines of communication; however, after these lines were initially established (within the first 90 minutes of exercise), the P&I Section did not continue ongoing communication for additional situational updates from these other jurisdictions.

**Area for Improvement 1.2:** City of Los Angeles vertical communication with the LA County Operational Area requires improvement.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Vertical communication with the LA County Operational Area EOC was not established until several hours into the exercise. The LA City EOC was blind to any updates on the manhunt, or any information related to information beyond the information obtained from the initial contact with Long Beach and Pasadena. In addition, the LA City EOC was not providing information or situation updates to the Operational Area until this communication was established. This lack of communication between the City and the Operational Area hindered providing situational awareness in both directions as well as delayed the development of a common operating picture.

In past exercises and real-world events, an arrangement was made for an LA City EMD representative to go to the LA County Operational Area EOC and for an LA County OEM representative to come to the LA City EOC. Representatives were not exchanged during the LA CCTA FE. Post-exercise during the After-Action Meeting (AAM), exercise planning team members indicated that the practice of exchanging EOC representatives still exists but was not feasible for this exercise.

**Area for Improvement 1.3:** LA City EOC personnel were not familiar with OARRS (the functions of OARRS, as well as when to use).

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The Operational Area Response and Recovery System (OARRS) is the primary means of electronic communication and data capturing for local jurisdictions to share situational information to, or request resources from the County Operational Area. During the exercise, personnel were unfamiliar with the system. This was in part to LA City EMD personnel working remotely for an extended period and out of practice in using the system and in part to lack of training associated with the use.

**Area for Improvement 1.4:** EOC Personnel need to become better familiar with VEOCI (LA City's replacement software system for WebEOC) with how to use and what the capabilities are within the system.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** With EMD personnel working remotely for an extended period (this period was also when the switch was made from WebEOC to VEOCI), EMD staff had varying degrees of familiarity with the new software including its capabilities. Since the City switched from WebEOC to VEOCI during COVID, boards were designed around COVID (with the intent to continue development as staff returned to work in the office and normal operations resumed); unfortunately, boards displayed a COVID situation report and did



not focus on the immediate situation. Had this been a real-world event, the boards could not easily be switched from COVID to a general incident.

The main board being displayed was confusing for displaying situational awareness, there were two screens displaying “significant events,” but they were not synchronized and displayed different info, it seems as if one was being updated regularly where the other board was only updated initially.

VEOCI has an embedded map function and was displayed on the visual board; however, the EOC bypassed this feature and placed a GIS technician in the management room and kept one in the EOC in the P&I Section. As map updates were needed, the GIS person in Planning & Intelligence would relay the info to the technician in the management room and they would display the info on a map in the management room. As a result, there were only two accurate maps (one in the P&I Section (not on display) and one in the management room on display only in the management room). Because of this disconnect, the vast majority of EOC personnel were not able to see an accurate map on display. Additionally, most EOC staff were unfamiliar with how to update the VEOCI map (e.g., mass care was not able to update any of their sites). A map is a valuable and powerful tool in the EOC, but only if everyone has access to it.

**Area for Improvement 1.5:** Although the JRIC Intelligence Officer embedded within the Management Section of the LA City EOC was identified as a strength, it was also an area for improvement because of the lack of transparent communication for situational awareness and a common operating picture.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Although Situational Awareness was obtained through the model of embedding a JRIC Intelligence Officer in the Management Section, the model was very compartmentalized. When a JRIC conference call took place, the JRIC Intelligence Officer and an adjutant of the Police EOC Director and Fire EOC Director attended the conference call, and that information was subsequently relayed directly to the EOC Directors when they returned from the conference call. In addition, the JRIC Intelligence Officer would obtain ongoing information from the JRIC directly through email, phone call, or text message and would immediately pass on any relevant information to the EOC Directors. This model allowed the EOC Directors to be kept in the loop, but the P&I Section was not aware of any of the information exchanged or gathered through the conference calls or direct communication between the JRIC Intelligence Officer and JRIC.

Evaluators understand and acknowledge that sensitive information is being shared/exchanged; however certain personnel in the P&I Section should be read in and allowed to attend these meetings/conference calls and then a protocol put in place to determine what information should/should not be placed in situation reports, but the P&I Section cannot develop a true Common Operating Picture if all JRIC info is kept from them, not all JRIC info is sensitive. Develop protocols for determining what information is sensitive for only the EOC Directors, Planning and Intelligence Section, Investigations Unit, and general knowledge for situation reports. Keep in mind, that situation reports for the EOC are still confidential documents and not to be shared beyond the EOC unless expressly allowed by policy or procedure, so a level of trust needs to be considered for those assigned to the EOC for them to effectively do their job with all pertinent information necessary.

**Area for Improvement 1.6:** City of Long Beach resource and information requests entered in VEOCI did not have due dates/deadlines.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide



**Analysis:** During a dynamic incident such as a CCTA, prioritization of requests for information and resources becomes critically important. When resource and information requests are received, the time it is received, when it was inputted into VEOCI, and a due date for the request should all be inputted into the system. During the exercise, it was noted by the evaluator that although VEOCI tracks when a request for information or resources is inputted into the system, some requests were not assigned due dates or deadlines, and no notes were made on when the requests were received prior to being inputted into VEOCI.

**Area for Improvement 1.7:** Long Beach City EOC Staff were not pre-assigned to positions prior to signing into VEOCI.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Prior to any activation, key command staff and supporting positions should be assigned based on a pre-existing EOC duty roster. If one does not exist, staff should be assigned positions and notified of their position when they are activated and asked to report and/or login to VEOCI. While it was noted that the exercise participants were new to the VEOCI system, participants stated during the hot wash that they were not pre-assigned positions prior to logging into the system, which delayed the activation process and potentially, the initial response.

**Area for Improvement 1.8:** The LA County OA EOC did input an initial situation overview in their information sharing platform but did not continue to add updated information to the OA jurisdictions and CalOES as events occurred along the exercise timeline.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The LA County OA EOC has identified the Operational Area Response and Recovery System (OARRS) as the primary platform to share information with OA jurisdictions. The site allows for OA jurisdictions to input situation reports up to the LA County EOC. OA jurisdictions failed to enter any periodic situation updates into OARRS throughout the day. A call to the jurisdictions to request use of OARRS did not occur until exercise midpoint. After the call, OA jurisdictions still did not submit reports into OARRS. The LA County OA EOC did not take any corrective action to establish an alternate method, i.e., conference calls, request for hard copy of Sitreps, etc. Though the LA County OA EOC did input one entry into OARRS with an incident overview, the lack of OA jurisdiction real time situation updates resulted in ineffective SA compilation and the development of a shared evolving COP. This operational failure continued to negatively impact performance of targets and critical tasks under this objective.

Another roadblock to an effective communication loop, after discussion with EOC personnel about the information flow in OARRS, is it is set up as a one-way information exchange. OA jurisdictions are expected to provide on-going updated situation reports into OARRS, sharing timely and relevant information to the LA County OA EOC. But the process and software platform does not have the LA County OA EOC providing on-going situation reports down to the OA jurisdictions. The accuracy of the information in OARRS to develop SA and COP rests completely on OA jurisdiction input. A hard copy sitrep was prepared by the LA County EOC P&I Section for the 1430 transition meeting, but their planning process does not call for the sharing of any internal sitreps.

As a result, a unified and coordinated operational information exchange loop was not established and maintained within the OA.





**Area for Improvement 1.9:** The LA County OA EOC was not able to establish a shared COP between the OA jurisdictions.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** From the perspective of the LA County OA EOC staff, the communication of the OA COP rested on the OA jurisdictions decision to use OARRS. When the OA jurisdictions did not enter information into the platform, the task of establishing an OA-wide COP was blocked. The LA County OA EOC accepted this roadblock and did not take action to identify a work around. No attempts to contact the jurisdictions to request use of OARRS were made until a process question came up mid exercise. There was no discussion or decision to come up with alternate methods that would achieve this critical task.

**Area for Improvement 1.10:** The LA County OA EOC did provide minimal on-going assistance in obtaining appropriate resources and personnel to support their operations in response to injects. They did not coordinate resource requests through OARRS.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The LA County OA EOC does recognize its role as the coordination point for assistance with resource support and was prepared to conduct the actions to achieve this capability. It did make contact early on with the State. EOC personnel did address and assist with a few resource requests coming in through injects. With OA jurisdictions failing to utilize OARRS, the effectiveness of the OA's actual resource request conduit and coordination process was not observed.

**Area for Improvement 1.11:** The LA County OA EOC completed a few resource requests that came in through injects. OA jurisdictions did not utilize OARRS including the resource request boards. This impacted the ability of the LA County OA EOC to serve as the OA-level mutual aid coordination point for OA jurisdictions seeking resource support.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The LA County OA EOC does recognize its role as the coordination point for assistance with resource support and was prepared to conduct the actions to achieve this capability. It did make contact early on with the State. EOC personnel did address and assist with a few resource requests coming in through injects. With OA jurisdictions failing to utilize OARRS, the effectiveness of the OA's actual resource request conduit and coordination process was not observed.

**Area for Improvement 1.12:** The LA County OA EOC has identified OARRS as the primary platform to share information with OA jurisdictions. The web-based platform provides the primary method to acquire, share, and distribute information throughout the OA. The LA County OA EOC did input one situation overview into the incident board during the exercise but did not continue to provide real-time updates to the situation information. OA jurisdictions failed to use OARRS to input any information.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** With the LA County OA EOC providing only one Sitrep throughout the incident timeline and OA jurisdictions failing to enter their periodic reports, the sharing, acquiring, and/or distribution of information throughout the OA was minimal. A call to the jurisdictions to request use of OARRS did not occur until exercise midpoint. After the call, OA jurisdictions still did not submit reports into OARRS. The LA County OA EOC did not take any action to establish an alternate method, i.e., conference calls, request



for hard copy of Sitreps, etc. The LA County OA EOC did not provide periodic updates into OARRS as events evolved.

**Area for Improvement 1.13:** Initial coordination between the LAPD DOC and EOC representatives was challenging.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Personnel that staff the LAPD DOC have varying levels of DOC training ranging from some training to intermediate and advanced training. At StartEx, DOC to EOC communication was challenging, particularly use of VEOCI for communication. The LAPD DOC controller encouraged participants to pick up the phone, call their LAPD counterparts in the EOC, and simply talk with them. Coordination improved. Moreover, DOC participants implemented a paper process to document actions taken and follow up actions if required. DOC personnel also began to use DOC situational awareness tools (e.g., whiteboards, flip charts, etc.) to document basic incident information. The LAPD simulator indicated that once the DOC began to leverage these tools their situational awareness and overall incident knowledge improved. Though some of these processes can be viewed as “old school” they worked and improved coordination over time.

**Area for Improvement 1.14:** LAPD EOC staff need more EOC position specific and VEOCI training; and drills.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Exercise evaluators stated that LAPD personnel staffing the EOC law enforcement branch did not fully understand the responsibilities of positions they were filling. Moreover, they lacked basic understanding of whom to contact for emergency functions like evacuation and sheltering support.



## Objective 2: Evaluate the process of and ability of participating agencies to gain and maintain situational awareness and share a common operating picture in response to a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring with Los Angeles County.

The strengths and areas for improvement for each core capability aligned to this objective are described in this section.

### Core Capability: Situational Assessment

#### Strengths

The *Partial* capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

**Strength 1:** The Los Angeles City EOC Planning and Intelligence Section did work well with the Operations Section to ascertain information. In addition, the PSC and the OSC worked well in establishing a “battle rhythm” for the main EOC floor in producing requisite materials and set deadlines which were regularly communicated to all personnel in the EOC, so expectations were not only set, but they were also met.

**Strength 2:** The LA City EOC PSC was diligent in following up on information requests made to her by the Directors as well as other EOC staff. The PSC was cognizant of the workload and pressure on the P&I Section staff and made sure to check in with them on a regular basis to ensure they had the tools needed to perform their job and to just check in on their stress level.

**Strength 3:** The LA City EOC Directors gave regular updates to the EOC floor to maintain motivation and to set the demeanor and tempo of the EOC.

**Strength 4:** During the exercise, exercise evaluators observed that LA City EOC staff often reached out to the Planning and Intelligence Section to share information. It was well understood by EOC staff that pertinent information must be shared with the P&I Section.

**Strength 5:** The LA City EOC Planning and Intelligence Section worked with the Operations Section and other EOC Sections to collect essential information.

**Strength 6:** The LA City EOC Planning Section staff was able to properly maintain the electronic situation displays.

**Strength 7:** The LA City EOC does have a proper process to establish and maintain an open file of situation reports for review by the EOC staff by using VEOCI.

**Strength 8:** The LA City EOC Planning and Intelligence Section was able to prepare Situation Reports for the P&I Section Coordinator prior to key meetings as part of the EOC action planning process.

**Strength 9:** The EOC successfully ensured the PIO Lead was provided with Situation Status information for use to develop media and other briefings

**Strength 10:** City of Long Beach exercise participants were able to quickly familiarize themselves with the VEOCI system and input/respond to requests throughout the exercise.



**Strength 11:** City of Long Beach exercise participants were able to coordinate with outside agencies throughout the exercise using established communication channels.

**Strength 12:** City of Long Beach EOC participants were able to respond and regularly updated all requests for situational awareness information throughout the exercise.

**Strength 13:** City of Long Beach EOC situation reports generated by participants were thorough, detailed, and were regularly updated during the exercise.

**Strength 14:** The LA County OA EOC PIO worked closely with the EOC Director and all EOC Sections to collect and verify situation status information and develop media talking points. The PIO also coordinated effectively with other OA jurisdiction EOC PIOs to support a JIS process. In collaboration, the PIOs were able to establish 1) primary and support responsibilities for media inquiries 2) commitment to “speaking with one voice” by sharing and agreeing on released information, and 3) logistical actions to prepare for a coordinated OA press conference.

**Strength 15:** The LA County OA EOC did produce one hard copy Sitrep in the EAP for the 1430 transition briefing.

**Strength 16:** The LA County OA EOC Operations Section, Law Branch did make calls to activated OA jurisdiction EOCs and law enforcement DOCs to verify incoming information for posting. The JRIC AREP and the FBI AREP coordinated with the Law Branch to verify information with the JRIC. The Law Branch, JRIC AREP, and the FBI AREP participated in an LAPD coordinated call to discuss and analyze incoming information.

**Strength 17:** The LA County OA EOC Planning and Intelligence Section coordinated with the Operations Section to develop a collection and reporting plan to capture essential information. A collection and reporting schedule was shared at the initial 0930 Planning Meeting and communicated to the EOC personnel on the floor.

**Strength 18:** The internal information sharing process flow in the LA County OA EOC was effective. All EOC personnel did a good job of providing timely updates and unfolding events to the P&I Section Coordinator as needed. EOC personnel were observed getting up and interacting with the P&I Section, to discuss and share incoming information. The P&I Section Coordinator did a good job of periodically walking the EOC floor to talk with other Sections.

**Strength 19:** The LA County OA EOC organization addresses the need to activate various positions to ensure trained personnel are available to analyze incident specific information. The Law Enforcement Branch, the JRIC AREP, and the FBI AREP did an excellent job of maintaining and analyzing on-going information in coordination with the JRIC and other law enforcement agencies from the other jurisdictions.

**Strength 20:** The LA County OA EOC has identified the OARRS boards as the defined process to collect, compile, and analyze OA, OA cities, and other stakeholder situational information. In observing the various LA County OA EOC personnel, they were accessing and using the OARRS platform. This internal use of their primary emergency management software program contributed to effective information capture and sharing on the LA County OA EOC floor.



## Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

**Area for Improvement 2.1:** Establishing Essential Elements of Information and determining information deliverables for decision makers in the Los Angeles City EOC to provide them “actionable information” did not occur.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator did not meet with the EOC Directors to establish what their EEs were and what specific information they wanted to see which led to delays in getting “actional information” to the Directors. Approximately 3.5 hours into the exercise the Directors pulled the PSC into the management room because the Situation Report format was not useful to the Directors, the Police EOC Director even commented that the current format confused him regarding the multiple incidents taking place simultaneously. The Directors sat down with the PSC to determine what information they wanted to know (these are the EEs that should have been established by the PSC earlier in the event). Evaluators acknowledge that each incident will be different, and each incident will have different audiences, some EEs can be standardized, but incident specific and audience specific EEs will need to be determined for each incident.

**Area for Improvement 2.2:** Displaying situational awareness information within the LA City EOC to establish a common operating picture among EOC personnel requires improvement.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** With EMD personnel working remotely for an extended period (this period was also when the switch was made from WebEOC to VEOCI), EMD staff had varying degrees of familiarity with the new software including its capabilities. Since the City switched from WebEOC to VEOCI during COVID, boards were designed around COVID (with the intent to continue development as staff returned to work in the office and normal operations resumed); unfortunately, boards displayed a COVID situation report and did not focus on the immediate situation. Had this been a real-world event, the boards could not easily be switched from COVID to a general incident. The main board being displayed was confusing for displaying situational awareness, there were two screens displaying “significant events,” but they were not synchronized and displayed different info, it seems as if one was being updated regularly where the other board was only updated initially. VEOCI has an embedded map function and was displayed on the visual board; however, the EOC bypassed this feature and placed a GIS technician in the management room and kept one in the EOC in the Planning and Intelligence Section. As map updates were needed, the GIS person in Plans would relay the info to the technician in the management room and they would display the info on a map in the management room. As a result, there were only two accurate maps (one in the Planning and Intelligence Section (not on display) and one in the management room on display only in the management room). Because of this disconnect, the vast majority of EOC personnel were not able to see an accurate map on display. Additionally, most EOC staff were unfamiliar with how to update the VEOCI map (e.g., mass care was not able to update any of their sites). A map is a valuable and powerful tool in the EOC, but only if everyone has access to it.



**Area for Improvement 2.3:** Adequate staffing and properly trained personnel in the LA City EOC Planning and Intelligence Section.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The P&I Section plays a vital role in any EOC, and the section was inadequately staffed. The Advanced Planning Unit and another Unit were staffed by EMD interns that had never worked in the EOC before, they were not shadowing experienced personnel, they were assigned as the primary staff. In addition, with an EOC as sophisticated as LA City with the ability to have multiple screens/boards/maps projected on the multiple video displays on the main wall, there should be a dedicated “Display Processor” position who is responsible for updating the displays as needed (this used to be a designated position within the P&I Section at the LA City EOC). A Display Processor may have helped alleviate some of the above issues with VEOCI or the map.

**Area for Improvement 2.4:** The LA City EOC struggled to determine and share casualty counts and extent of damage to the Double Tree Hotel.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Based on the LA City EOC staff’s own acknowledgement, it was challenging for them to be able to gather pertinent incident information from multiple sources of information during a dynamic incident. Although casualty and damage resulting from the Double Tree explosions eventually was collected by the EOC, the information was significantly delayed, and marginally shared with EOC staff.

**Area for Improvement 2.5:** There was no evidence of defined information requirements with essential information categories for a terrorism event in the final LA County OA EOC EAP Sitrep.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** There was no evidence of defined information requirements with essential information categories for a terrorism event in the final LA County OA EOC EAP Sitrep. In a discussion with the LA County OA EOC P&I Section Chief, it was stated they do have defined areas of information they try to capture, for example damages, evacuations, injuries, etc.

Exercise evaluators noted the logging of what situation information should be input into any reporting, was defined only from the broad category of “Incident Description.” The Sitrep form did not prompt for defined information focused on aspects of terrorism SA. Additional sections in the Sitrep provided for LACo FD and LASD were formatted as freeform entries, leaving it up to the person inputting data to decide what was relevant.

**Area for Improvement 2.6:** OARRS information is accessible to all DOCs. County department representatives staffing positions in the EOC is a standard protocol. What was not observed in the LA County OA EOC EAP and the OARRS board is a format that captures defined, essential elements of information requirements from the departments. Evaluators did not have a current copy of an EOC plan to check activation protocols on what critical information data should be captured in the situation assessment process.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** During exercise observations the logging of what situation information should be input into any reporting, was defined only from the broad category of “Incident Description.” The Situation Report



format did not prompt for information focused on specific, defined elements. Additional Sitrep sections, provided for LACo FD and LASD, were formatted as freeform entries, leaving it up to the person inputting data to decide what was relevant.

**Area for Improvement 2.7:** Use of available LA County OA EOC displays were not optimized throughout the Op Period.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The LA County EOC staff did upload and maintain a map identifying incident locations, on one of the three available display boards. The remaining two available display boards were not used. A white board was set up first thing in the morning with the incident name. No written updates were logged in throughout the day.

**Area for Improvement 2.8:** The LA County OA EOC did establish a single incident file location in OARRS. EOC staff were able to review the initial OARRS board entry. An open file of additional situation reports, from within the EOC and from other OA jurisdiction EOCs was not maintained throughout the OP Period.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** OA jurisdictions failed to use OARRS to enter situation reports. The LA County OA EOC did produce one hard copy Sitrep in the EAP for the 1430 transition briefing. This resulted in minimal and incomplete situation information in the open files. Because only one Sitrep was produced the information was not timely and reflective of the scope and scale of impacts to the OA.

## Core Capability: Intelligence and Information Sharing

### Strengths

The *Partial* capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

**Strength 1:** City of Long Beach participants were able to coordinate the sharing of intelligence and information with outside agencies throughout the exercise using established communication channels and update them through VEOCI.

**Strength 2:** The Los Angeles County EOC Planning and Intelligence Section collaborated often with the Operations Section. Both Sections were observed exchanging situational awareness and coordinated to provide multiple updates to the EOC during the exercise.

**Strength 3:** The Los Angeles County EOC Law Enforcement (L/E) Branch Coordinator, and the Agency Representatives (AREps.) from the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) established and maintained strong communications throughout the exercise. The L/E Branch Director and AREps from the JRIC coordinated throughout the exercise and shared various situational updates with each other.

**Strength 4:** The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) - Intel was displayed effectively in the Los Angeles City EOC Management Section. System was used to share and deconflict information. The strength of HSIN-Intel is anyone with the need to know can be assigned an account.

**Strength 5:** The Intelligence Coordination Conference Call conducted during the exercise should be considered a best practice and continued in future exercises and real-world events.



**Strength 6:** The City of Long Beach EOC developed and sent two situation reports to the Los Angeles County EOC.

### Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

**Area for Improvement 2.9:** Exchange of sensitive but unclassified information hinders information sharing between the JRIC and Los Angeles County Operational Area.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** During the exercise, information received by the JRIC AReps was often classified as Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) and required redaction prior to sharing with the broader Operational Area EOC. The inability to share LES information with the broader Operational Area EOC led to an incomplete understanding of the current situation, limited decision-making abilities, and hampered the EOC's ability anticipate support needs.

**Area for Improvement 2.10:** Exercise participants are overwhelmed by the sheer number of information management platforms used to share information.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Exercise evaluators noted that exercise participants had difficulty understanding how information management systems (e.g., HSIN-Intel, DLAN, VEOCI, WebEOC, OARRS, Justice Connect, etc.) are used to manage and share information during an incident. Knowing the purpose of each system, how they integrate into the common operating picture, and what information can be obtained is important.

**Area for Improvement 2.11:** The common operating picture components require definition.

**Reference:** Objective 2 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The common operating picture (COP) is made up of a variety of information conveyances. Examples include the EOC floor briefing, Sitrep and Action Plans; Unified Command Incident Action Plan, coordination calls, shift change briefings, etc. A shared common understanding comes from knowing what information components form the COP and how to access them.

**Area for Improvement 2.12:** Lateral and vertical law enforcement information sharing between law enforcement agencies requires improvement.

**Reference:** Objective 1 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Exercise evaluators indicated that real-world law enforcement information sharing between agencies requires improvement. They cited the challenges with communicating with the Los Angeles Sheriff's DOC during DOC activations. They cited that the Sheriff's Department maintains a 24/7 DOC for normal, steady state operations. During an incident that requires the Sheriff's DOC activation, the day-to-day DOC is augmented with the activation of a DOC focused on the incident. The incident-focused DOC has a different function and location which, according to evaluators, confuses personnel from outside agencies that are used to interacting with the steady state DOC. Moreover, evaluators mentioned that information sharing between LE agencies is not a cultural norm because "they want to make sure they get it right" before they share information. This practice delays information sharing and prevents agencies that have a need to know from receiving information that could be actionable. The LA CCTA Concept of





**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Operations was developed to help overcome the current culture and replace it with a practice of “who else needs to know what I know” information sharing culture.



## Objective 3: Evaluate the ability of participating EOCs and DOCs to support the field response and community needs following a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring within Los Angeles County.

The strengths and areas for improvement for each core capability aligned to this objective are described in this section.

### Core Capability: Logistics and Supply Chain Management

#### Strengths

The *Partial* capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

**Strength 1:** City of Long Beach EOC participants quickly responded to internal and external requests for manpower and resources, documented and closed out each request once it had been fulfilled through VEOCI.

**Strength 2:** City of Long Beach EOC participants were knowledgeable on the processes and procedures within VEOCI and had an experienced coordinator/administrator on hand to provide support as needed.

**Strength 3:** The Los Angeles City EOC staff was familiar with the EOC's resource request process. The LA City EOC uses VEOCI to facilitate their resource request process and that process was well understood by the EOC staff.

**Strength 4:** The Los Angeles City Logistics Section staff did a good job at immediately processing resources requests. They were able to properly re-direct and track the resources accordingly by using a Google Document to track resources requests.

**Strength 5:** The LA City Logistics Section Coordinator promptly organized the Logistics Section, briefed staff on the duties and responsibilities of the Section and was ready to initiate the logistics support to incident operations.

**Strength 6:** The LA City Management Section did a good job of forecasting resources and identifying at-risk critical infrastructure that should be closed and/or shut down until the scope of the threat was known or better understood.

**Strength 7:** Exercise evaluators stated that LAPD DOC personnel proactively anticipated the needs of field units.

#### Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

**Area for Improvement 3.1:** Although Los Angeles City EOC participants understood the EOC's process to receive, approve, process, and track requests for resources, and was able to provide logistical support for field operations, the EOC encountered some challenges identifying existing internal, jurisdiction-specific resources available to support response and recovery operations.

**Reference:** Objective 3 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Exercise evaluators attributed the difficulty with identifying existing internal and jurisdiction specific resources available to support response and recovery operations to two issues. First, the Logistics



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Section lacked good situational awareness which hampered their ability to anticipate and proactively acquire resources needed to support field operations. Moreover, evaluators also noted the absence of a pre-identified list of internal and external resources for personnel to reference. Finally, evaluators course not confirm the existence of a logistics and distribution plan.



## Objective 4: Evaluate the participating EOCs ability to utilize the JIS to coordinate and provide accurate, accessible, and timely public information and warning.<sup>1</sup>

The strengths and areas for improvement for each core capability aligned to this objective are described in this section.

### Core Capability: Public Information and Warning

#### Strengths

The *Partial* capability level can be attributed to the following strengths:

**Strength 1:** The City of Los Angeles PIOs monitored media coverage of events to ensure that information was accurately relayed. This critical task was completed in a manner that achieved the objective, did not negatively impact the performance of other public information activities, and was conducted in accordance with applicable plans, policies, and procedures. The PIO's were monitoring the media/injects/messages, verifying that the public and officials were getting accurate and complete information through the media in a timely manner. As exercise play developed PIOs were able to address the issue/concern raised by the inconsistent information provided by the LAUSD regarding the pickup of students by parents at schools instead on the Lock-Down/Shelter-in-Place orders imposed by LAPD earlier in the incident.

**Strength 2:** Los Angeles City PIOs provided periodic updates and conducted regularly scheduled media conferences. During the exercise the PIOs were challenged with numerous injects/messages from the media, the PIO group was able to quickly coordinate, announce and conduct (2) press conferences to address media inquiries.

**Strength 3:** City of Los Angeles PIOs established contact with pre-identified community partners which serve the non-English speaking, and people with disabilities and those with access and/or functional needs to allow them to initiate their communications protocols. The Los Angeles City JIC had a representative from the Department on Disability, and she was very well versed on the responsibility of the JIC to communicate with all audiences, including DAFN and persons with language requirements. She was able to coordinate a Sign Language Interpreter function during media briefings/press conferences, worked with the LAPD to provide translation services as needed and the provided the appropriate technology to address DAFN audience communications via the EOC's Information Hot-Line.

**Strength 4:** The Los Angeles JIC developed and implemented a community relations plan for ensuring continued communications with citizens and city, county, State, Federal, and private industry leaders.

**Strength 5:** City of Los Angeles PIOs successfully identified public information needs in response to a simulated complex coordinated terrorist attack. Moreover, they coordinated public emergency information in accordance with established plans, policies, and procedures.

**Strength 6:** The Operational Area PIO consistently coordinated with all Sections within the EOC to ensure media related materials were current with the most up to date information.

---

<sup>1</sup> The City of Long Beach PIO did not participate in the exercise.



## Areas for Improvement

The following areas require improvement to achieve the full capability level:

**Area for Improvement 4.1:** At the start of the exercise, exercise participants had difficulty appointing a Lead Public Information Officer (PIO) to coordinate the dissemination of all emergency information, press releases, and public statements, to prevent conflicting information, misinformation, and the initiation of rumors.

**Reference:** Objective 4 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** At the start of the exercise there was some confusion as to who/what agency was the lead PIO for the unfolding bombing of the Double Tree Hotel in downtown Los Angeles. Moreover, the location of the Joint Information Center (JIC) was not next to the EOC Management Room which made it difficult for PIO's to maintain good communication and situational awareness. Initially PIO's were unable to coordinate the dissemination of emergency public information.

**Area for Improvement 4.2:** Initially, the Los Angeles City JIC had difficulty developing, coordinating, and distributing emergency public information and warnings to the public, media in a timely manner.

**Reference:** Objective 4 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** The delay in getting a proper JIC location made it difficult for the PIO's to handle media inquiries, maintain communication and situational awareness. First arriving Injects/Messages from the simulations cell were not handled as the controllers were leaving them in the EOC Management/PIO Room where there were no PIO's present (*Note: At the start of the exercise the location of the JIC was identified to be in the EOC Training Room*). This issue was quickly handled by the lead PIO (LAPD) as he shifted the location of the JIC to the Executive Conference Room (next to EOC Management and with a view of the EOC Main Floor) near the best sources of information.

**Area for Improvement 4.3:** The Los Angeles City JIC did not establish an organization chart identifying the roles and functions for each JIC position.

**Reference:** Objective 4 Exercise Evaluation Guide

**Analysis:** Once the JIC was established in the appropriate location, the PIO's began to fill the roles and functions (not formally established or assigned) required to disseminate coordinated and consistent messages. Evaluators speculate that the level of PIO experience afforded them the opportunity to "jump right in" and get going. Though PIO functions were being accomplished, the JIC did not establish an organization chart identifying the roles and functions for each position. Although some of these roles and functions were performed, it was unclear who was responsible for the roles and functions of the JIC:

- Information Gathering – Response Partners, Media Monitoring and Analysis; Research and Writing; and Audio Visual
- Information Dissemination – Briefings/Special Events, Media Phones/Support, Web/social media, Status Board
- Operations Support – Disabilities and Access and Functional Needs (DAFN), Facility Support, Media Reception
- Liaison – Field PIO, VIP Escort, Community Relations



## APPENDIX A: IMPROVEMENT PLAN

This IP has been developed specifically for *Los Angeles Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Program* as a result of the *Los Angeles CCTA Functional Exercise* conducted on March 17, 2022.

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element <sup>2</sup>	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
Evaluate the horizontal and vertical operational coordination between the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, City of Pasadena EOCs, associated DOCs, and other agencies responding to a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring within Los Angeles County Operational Area.	Operational Coordination	1.1: Los Angeles EOC did not maintain horizontal communication with other impacted jurisdictional EOCs.	1.1.1. EMD should foster relationships prior to an incident with local jurisdictions, in particular any jurisdiction which is immediately adjacent to and borders the City of Los Angeles. These relationships should develop a means for information sharing in the event of a real-world incident so EOCs are not scrambling to develop information sharing protocols in the heat of battle. Once an incident occurs that involves both the City of Los Angeles and another local jurisdiction the City of LA EOC should establish initial lines of communication as well as maintain on-going two-way communication flow to share information for situational awareness to form a common operating picture for all entities involved.	Planning	LA EMD		4/21	
		1.2: City of Los Angeles vertical communication with the LA County Operational Area requires improvement.	1.2.1. City of Los Angeles EMD and Los Angeles County OEM should reestablish the practice of providing liaison officers to each other's EOCs, if feasible.	Org	LA EMD		4/21	

<sup>2</sup> Capability Elements are Planning, Organization (Org), Equipment, Training, or Exercise.



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		1.3: LA City EOC personnel were not familiar with OARRS (the functions of OARRS, as well as when to use).	1.3.1. EMD should conduct regular training on OARRS regarding how and when to utilize.	Planning	LA EMD		4/21	
		1.4: EOC Personnel need to become better familiar with VEOCI (LA City's replacement software system for WebEOC) with how to use and what the capabilities are within the system.	1.4.1. EMD should put together a working group to collaborate on designing "all-hazard" information boards for VEOCI that meet the needs of Essential Elements of Information for the vast majority of EOC stakeholders to quickly ascertain information immediately as well as discipline or EOC section specific boards tailored more for the information needs of those positions.	Planning	LA EMD		4/21	
			1.4.2. EMD should schedule regular training sessions for all EOC responders and test the knowledge and skills of these responders through simple VEOCI drills.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	
		1.5: Although the JRIC Intelligence Officer embedded within the Management Section of the LA City EOC was identified as a strength, it was also an area for improvement because of the lack of transparent communication for situational awareness and a common operating picture.	1.5.1. Develop protocols for determining what information is sensitive, intended for only the EOC Directors, Planning and Intelligence Section, Investigations Unit, and general knowledge for situation reports.	Planning	LA EMD/ JRIC		4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		1.6: City of Long Beach resource and information requests entered in VEOCI did not have due dates/deadlines.	1.6.1. Update VEOCI instructions and checklists to include proper inputting of information to include due dates/deadlines and actual time received (prior to being inputted into VEOCI).	Planning	City of Long Beach		4/21	
			1.6.2. Conduct additional staff training with VEOCI to reinforce the updated instructions and checklists.	Training	City of Long Beach		4/21	
		1.7: Long Beach City EOC Staff were not pre-assigned to positions prior to signing into VEOCI.	1.7.1. Conduct additional training on EOC/VEOCI Activation plans, processes, and policies.	Training	City of Long Beach		4/21	
			1.7.2. Ensure that the processes and procedures regarding assignment of ICS positions are codified in the VEOCI user guides and checklists.	Planning	City of Long Beach		4/21	





**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		1.8: The LA County OA EOC did input an initial situation overview in their information sharing platform but did not continue to add updated information to the OA jurisdictions and CaIOES as events occurred along the exercise timeline.	1.8.1. The OA, with LA County OEM leading the effort, needs to identify and adopt a single, primary information sharing platform. This platform, regardless of any other systems used within OA jurisdiction EOCs, will be used for the development of SA and COP across the OA. The information sharing platform should reflect a process that triggers periodic situation updates as new information comes in. If this is OARRS, then it needs to be utilized consistently across the OA.	Equipment	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			1.8.2. The LA County EOC should also establish a back-up process to ensure the sharing of information and the continuity of operational coordination during incidents if there are issues with OARRS.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		1.9: The LA County OA EOC was not able to establish a shared COP between the OA jurisdictions.	1.9.1. Please reference Corrective Action 1.8.1.	Equipment	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			1.9.2. Please reference Corrective Action 1.8.2.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		1.10: The LA County OA EOC did provide minimal on-going assistance in obtaining appropriate resources and personnel to support their operations in response to injects. They did not coordinate resource requests through OARRS.	1.10.1. The LA County OA EOC should also establish a back-up resource ordering and tracking process to ensure continuity of operational coordination during incidents if there are issues with OARRS.	Equipment	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		1.11: The LA County OA EOC completed a few resource requests that came in through injects. OA jurisdictions did not utilize OARRS including the resource request boards. This impacted the ability of the LA County OA EOC to serve as the OA-level mutual aid coordination point for OA jurisdictions seeking resource support.	1.11.1. The OA, with LA County OEM leading the effort, needs to identify and adopt a single, primary platform for resource and personnel requests, to support the ability to assist OA jurisdictions. This platform, regardless of any other systems used within OA jurisdiction EOCs will be used for resource management.	Equipment	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			1.11.2. Please reference Corrective Action 1.10.1.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		1.12: The LA County OA EOC has identified OARRS as the primary platform to share information with OA jurisdictions. The web-based platform provides the primary method to acquire, share, and distribute information	1.12.1. The OA, with LA County OEM leading the effort, needs to identify and adopt a single, primary platform for sharing, acquiring, and/or distributing information throughout the OA. This platform, regardless of any other systems used within OA jurisdiction EOCs will be used for information management.	Equipment	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		throughout the OA. The LA County OA EOC did input one situation overview into the incident board during the exercise but did not continue to provide real-time updates to the situation information. OA jurisdictions failed to use OARRS to input any information.	1.12.2. The LA County OA EOC should also establish a back-up process to ensure continuity of operational coordination.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			1.12.3. Protocols should be in place for periodic updating of OARRS reporting both from the LA County OA EOC and the OA jurisdictions.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			1.12.4. The information management process and protocols should be included in the EOC activation section of the EOC plan.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		1.13: Initial coordination between the LAPD DOC and EOC representatives was challenging.	1.13.1. Provide LAPD DOC personnel with VEOCI and DOC training on operations and situational awareness tools one to two times a year.	Training	LA EMD/ LAPD		4/21	
		1.14: LAPD EOC staff need more EOC position specific and VEOCI training and drills.	1.14.1. Provide LAPD personnel with EOC position specific training.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	
			1.14.2. Conduct periodic drills to afford LAPD personnel the opportunity to practice the training received.	Exercise	LAPD		4/21	
			1.14.3. Consider increasing the length of EOC exercises to include a shift change.	Exercise	LA EMD		4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
<b>Evaluate the process of and ability of participating agencies to gain and maintain situational awareness and share a common operating picture in response to a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring with Los Angeles County.</b>	Situational Assessment	2.1: Establishing Essential Elements of Information and determining information deliverables for decision makers in the Los Angeles City EOC to provide them "actionable information" did not occur.	2.1.1. Provide training related to establishing EEI for various audiences since not all audiences will need the same info. Potential training would be the Situational Awareness and Common Operating Picture for EOCs course.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	
		2.2: Displaying situational awareness information within the LA City EOC to establish a common operating picture among EOC personnel requires improvement.	2.2.1. EMD should put together a working group to collaborate on designing "all-hazard" information boards for VEOCI that meet the needs of Essential Elements of Information for the vast majority of EOC stakeholders to quickly ascertain information immediately as well as discipline or EOC section specific boards tailored more for the information needs of those positions. EMD should then schedule regular training sessions for all EOC responders and test the knowledge and skills of these responders through simple VEOCI drills. Once EMD has enhanced their skillset with VEOCI, they should incorporate the mapping features of VEOCI to produce a common map that all personnel have access to.	Planning	LA EMD		4/21	
		2.3: Adequate staffing and properly trained personnel in the LA City EOC Planning and Intelligence Section.	2.3.1. Identify key units that need to be staffed at each level of EOC activation as well as which units need additional staffing as the degree of complexity in the EOC increases.	Planning	LA EMD		4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
			2.3.2. Develop an EOC SOG that outlines the minimum staffing requirements at each level and identify which department staffs the position.	Planning	LA EMD		4/21	
			2.3.3. Ensure that trained and qualified personnel staff the designated positions at least in the lead role as Unit Leader for each position, additional support staff working under each unit Leader can be interns or untrained personnel.	Org	LA EMD		4/21	
			2.3.4. Conduct tabletop exercises to ensure the P&I Section is familiar with their roles, these exercises should include setting a meeting schedule, establishing EEIs, developing a situation report and producing an Action Plan.	Exercise	LA EMD		4/21	
			2.3.5. The LA City EOC used to have a position designated as a "Display Processor" whose only job was to maintain the various situation board and screens on display, if this practice was abandoned, thought should be put into bringing back this position.	Org	LA EMD		4/21	
		2.4: The LA City EOC struggled to determine and share casualty counts and extent of damage to the Double Tree Hotel.	2.4.1. Provide additional training to EOC staff on the process to determine and identify EEI, the process to collect the EEI, and a proper, efficient, and prompt manner to share the EEI.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		2.5: There was no evidence of this capture of defined information requirements with essential information categories for a terrorism event in the final LA County OA EOC EAP Sitrep.	2.5.1. Essential elements of information support the incident critical analysis required by EOCs, performing their missions. Having agreed upon identification of the required information to share within the OA, is necessary for cross-jurisdictional information sharing. The LA County OA with LA County OEM as the lead, should discuss and identify those essential information categories to be shared with the LA County EOC and between OA jurisdiction EOCs.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			2.5.2. The LA County OA EOC Sitrep, EAP, and OARRS boards should be formatted to include these defined core essential elements that are critical to the LA County OA EOC and OA jurisdictions coordinated information sharing and critical decision-making.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			2.5.3. The identification of the required essential elements of information should be included in the EOC activation section, situational assessment process in the EOP.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		2.6: OARRS information is accessible to all DOCs.	2.6.1. Please reference Corrective Action 2.5.1.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		County department representatives staffing positions in the EOC is a standard protocol. What was not observed in the LA County OA EOC EAP and the OARRS board is a format that captures defined, essential elements of information requirements from the departments. Evaluators did not have a current copy of an EOC plan to check activation protocols on what critical information data should be captured in the situation assessment process.	2.6.2. Please reference Corrective Action 2.5.2.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			2.6.3. These defined essential elements should be identified in the EOC situation assessment protocols outlined in the EOC plan.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		2.7: Use of available LA County OA EOC displays were not optimized throughout the Op Period.	2.10.1. The LA County OA EOC should have a Display Plan, optimizing utilization of all available displays. Additional examples of display material could be a Significant Events Log, EOC Op Period Schedule with meetings, Sitrep submission times, etc., and the OARRS boards.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			2.10.2. Display Plan protocols can be included in the EOC activation, situation assessment protocols of the EOC plan.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		2.8: The LA County OA EOC did establish a single incident file location in OARRS. EOC staff were able to review the initial OARRS board entry. An open file of additional situation reports, from within the EOC and from other OA jurisdiction EOCs was not maintained throughout the OP Period.	2.8.1. Please reference Corrective Action 1.8.1.	Equipment	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
			2.8.2. Please reference Corrective Action 1.8.2.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
	Intelligence and Information Sharing	2.9: Exchange of sensitive but unclassified information hinders information sharing between the JRIC and Los Angeles County Operational Area.	2.9.1. Explore ways to share law enforcement sensitive information with emergency management staff.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		2.10: Exercise participants are overwhelmed by the sheer number of information management platforms used to share information.	2.10.1. Develop an information exchange requirements matrix that defines how each system is used to support information management.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		2.11: The common operating picture components require definition.	2.11.1. Consider identifying and publishing the information components that comprise the COP.	Planning	Los Angeles County OEM	Jeremy Harris	4/21	
		2.12: Lateral and vertical law enforcement information sharing	2.12.1. Provide law enforcement personnel with LA CCTA Concept of Operations training.	Training				





**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		between law enforcement agencies requires improvement.	2.12.2. Ensure future exercises have an information sharing component and they component is evaluated to ensure good information sharing takes place.	Exercise	LA County OEM/ LA EMD/ City of Long Beach		4/21	
<b>Evaluate the ability of participating EOCs and DOCs to support the field response and community needs following a complex coordinated terrorist attack occurring within Los Angeles County.</b>	Logistics and Supply Chain Management	3.1: Although Los Angeles City EOC participants understood the EOC's process to receive, approve, process, and track requests for resources, and was able to provide logistical support for field operations, the EOC encountered some challenges identifying existing internal, jurisdiction-specific resources available to support response and recovery operations.	3.1.1. Provide Logistics Section personnel with additional resource management and VEOCI resource tracking training.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	
<b>Evaluate the participating EOCs ability to utilize the JIS to coordinate and provide accurate, accessible, and timely public information and warning.</b>	Public Information and Warning	4.1: At the start of the exercise, exercise participants had difficulty appointing a Lead PIO to coordinate the dissemination of all emergency information, press releases, and public statements, to prevent conflicting information, misinformation, and the initiation of rumors.	4.1.1. The PIO's should receive ongoing PIO training (Citywide PIO's rotate frequently depending on what agency is available to fill a position/role therefore ongoing training is recommended) to include topics such as how the lead PIO is determined (the type of emergency confronting the City of Los Angeles dictates lead agency) and the benefits of making the location of the JIC within or next to the EOC Management Section.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

Objective	Core Capability	Issue/Area for Improvement	Corrective Action	Capability Element2	Primary Responsible Organization	Organization POC	Start Date	Completion Date
		4.2: Initially, the Los Angeles City JIC had difficulty developing, coordinating, and distributing emergency public information and warnings to the public, media in a timely manner.	4.2.1. PIO's should receive ongoing PIO training to include the operational practices for performing PIO duties within the Incident Command System (ICS), and to provide a fundamental guidance for any person or group delegated PIO responsibilities when informing the public is necessary as this will help ensure the coordination, distribution of emergency public information and warnings to the public and the media in a timely manner.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	
		4.3: The Los Angeles City JIC did not establish an organization chart identifying the roles and functions for each JIC position.	4.3.1. Please reference Corrective Action 4.2.1.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	
			4.3.2. The training should also include the process for establishing and knowing JIC roles and functions clearly delineated by a formal organizational chart.	Training	LA EMD		4/21	



This page intentionally left blank.



## APPENDIX B: EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

Participating Organizations
Jurisdictional Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs)
County of Los Angeles
City of Long Beach
City of Los Angeles
Los Angeles City Department Operations Centers (DOCs)
Department of Building and Safety
Department on Disability
Information Technology Agency
Department of Recreation and Parks
Department of Transportation
Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles
LA Sanitation (LASAN)
Los Angeles Fire Department
Los Angeles Police Department
Personnel Department
Port of Los Angeles
Other participating agencies
American Red Cross
Joint Regional Intelligence Center
Federal Bureau of Investigations
Orange County Intelligence Assessment Center



**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

This page intentionally left blank.



## APPENDIX C: PARTICIPANT FEEDBACK

Feedback forms were distributed to all participants after the exercise. They provided an opportunity for all the players, actors, and observers to provide comments and feedback on exercise design, conduct, and observed strengths and areas for improvement. The section below provides an analysis of the information received.

### Part I: Recommendations and Corrective Actions

1. Based on the exercise today, list the top three strengths.

- Communication in the room was great. (3)
- Scenario was good, real-life situation. (2)
- Pro-commitment to responding to an incident with intensity and desire.

Based on the exercise today, list the top three areas related to emergency response that need improvement.

- Technology updates needed like dual screens. (4)
- More VEOCI trainings and practice needed. (3)
- Improvement is needed with communication between divisions. (4)
- We need full access to the building, too many locked doors.
- Too much down time toward the end of exercise
- Stress testing and working JIC/JIS amongst stakeholders.
- PIO prep and public speaking/writing needed beforehand. (2)
- Injects didn't always follow process and need more information. (3)

2. Is there anything you saw in the exercise that the evaluator(s) might not have been able to experience, observe, and record?

- Difficulty communicating with others. (2)
- I called some phone numbers listed and got no response.
- Request was delayed because of long wait time.
- All agencies/jurisdictions must use one platform for sharing situational awareness.
- High level of frustration new personnel might be experiencing.
- Con-user friendly computer login interface needs updating.

3. Identify corrective actions that should be taken to address the issues identified above. For each corrective action, indicate if it is a high, medium, or low priority.

Technology updates needed	HIGH
Updates on binders/pods needed	HIGH
VEOCI training needed	HIGH
Communication needs to be worked on	HIGH
Encourage staff to participate	HIGH
Paper copy of list of names of employees and contact phone numbers needed	HIGH
More information needed about exercise prior to event	HIGH



Continue offering in-person training for those that desire it and offering support to have a fully functioning staff	HIGH
Improve injects to have more information	HIGH
Too many locked doors, key card access needed, or prop doors open for exercise	MEDIUM

## Part II: Assessment of Exercise Design and Conduct

Please rate by placing an “X” in the appropriate box, indicating your overall assessment of the Exercise relative to the statements provided below.

I feel that the exercise enhanced my understanding of issues related to...	Greatly	Much	Somewhat	Slightly	Not at All
The ability of my agency to support the field response and community needs following a CCTA incident.	52%	33%	13%	-	2%
The vertical and horizontal operational coordination and responsibilities of the various agencies/departments responding to a CCTA incident.	38%	45%	13%	2%	2%
The establishment and operation of a Unified Command during the response to an active shooter incident.	57%	38%	5%	-	-
Interagency communications & coordination during the response to a CCTA incident.	43%	38%	12%	2%	5%
The processes for gathering, developing, and sharing incident intelligence and/or information during a CCTA incident.	45%	33%	18%	4%	-
The process to utilize the JIS to coordinate and provide accurate, accessible, and timely public information and warning	43%	37%	10%	3%	7%

## Part III: Participant Feedback

Please provide any recommendations on how future exercises could be improved or enhanced.

- Very well done, Thank you! (5)
- Technology updates needed (3)
- Perhaps hand out a “cheat sheet” to start, a form participants get at the beginning to help engage them with “fill in the blank” sections.
- The binder was too much, it was a good resource but a one page “cheat sheet” might be more utilized.
- More exercises would be useful to stay current on procedures in case of real-life events.
- Create a drill for employees for terrorist attack or gun violence in the workplace.



## Los Angeles EOC Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series Functional Exercise

- Extend exercise with more time for discussion.
- Some expectations were unrealistic with respect to timeframe in which responses were required.
- I appreciate the time and effort by staff (especially Patty Magallanes) in explaining the exercise and the process. This was a great learning experience for me. I have a better understanding of the EOC process.
- Personnel should not spend 45 minutes trying to log onto computers, valuable time is spent on this alone while (potentially) lives are at stake.
- VEOCI needs to be more intuitive. A great deal of time was spent figuring out which positions had accounts, and which didn't. Some positions had to share and didn't know if everyone could complete their own 214's. More time was spent figuring out if we were in the right room, clear communication needed.





**Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise**

This page intentionally left blank.



## APPENDIX D: ACRONYM LIST

Acronym	Definition
AREP	Agency Representative
CalOES	The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
CCTA	Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack
COP	Common Operating Picture
DAFN	Disabilities and Access and Functional Needs
DLAN	DisasterLAN Emergency Software
DMORT	Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Teams
DOC	Department Operations Center
EAP	Emergency Action Plan
EEG	Exercise Evaluation Guide
EEL	Essential Elements of Information
EMD	Emergency Management Department
EOC	Emergency Operations Area
EOP	Emergency Operations Plan
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigations
FD	Fire Department
FE	Functional Exercise
HSIN	Homeland Security Information Network
HVE	Homegrown Violent Extremists
ICS	Incident Command System
IT	International Terrorist
JIS	Joint Information System
JRIC	Joint Regional Intelligence Center
L/E	Law Enforcement
LA	Los Angeles
LACo	Los Angeles County
LAPD	Los Angeles Police Department
LASD	Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department
LAUSD	Los Angeles Unified School District



Los Angeles EOC  
Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Exercise Series  
Functional Exercise

LES	Law Enforcement Sensitive
OA	Operational Area
OARRS	Operational Area Reporting and Recovery System
OEM	Office of Emergency Management
OSC	Operations Section Coordinator
P&I	Planning and Intelligence Section
PD	Police Department
PIO	Public Information Officer
PSC	Planning and Intelligence Section Coordinator
SA	Situational Awareness
SEMS	Standardized Emergency Management System
SitRep	Situation Report
SitStat	Situation Status
SOG	Standard Operating Guide
StartEx	Exercise Start Time
VEOCI	Virtual Emergency Operations Center Software