

# **AGENDA**

## **EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE**

**Wednesday, May 1, 2002, 9:00 a.m.**

**EOB Room, P- 4 Level, City Hall East**

- I. Call to Order, Introductions, Approval of Minutes**
- II. Subcommittee Reports and Planning Team**
  - Budget - Anna Burton
  - Community Preparedness/Training - Carol Parks
  - Emergency Preparedness Fair - Mark Davis
  - Facilities - Mark Davis
  - Fire/Life Safety - Howard Kaplan
  - Information Technology - Rita Khurana-Carwile
  - Operational Readiness/Planning - Rob Freeman
  - Recovery and Reconstruction - Larry Meyerhofer
  - Others
- III. 2002 EOO Annual Workshop - Rob Freeman**
- IV. Department Emergency Plans - Rob Freeman**
- V. NYC Post-Disaster Reconnaissance Team - Rob Freeman**
- VI. Information Items**
  - City Hall East Vent Retrofit - Richard Pineda
  - Homeland Security Needs Assessment - Anna Burton
- VII. Old/New Business**
- VIII. Adjournment**

Refreshments to be provided by the Office of the Mayor.

**EMC MEETING INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DEPARTMENT WEBSITE AT [www.lacity.org/epd](http://www.lacity.org/epd) - CLICK ON Emergency Operations Organization, then EMC.**

If you would like to be added to the EMC email distribution list, please send an email to [vcastillo@mailbox.lacity.org](mailto:vcastillo@mailbox.lacity.org). If you do not have an email address and would like to be added to the fax distribution list, please contact Vicky Castillo at (213) 978-0544.

# CITY OF LOS ANGELES

## INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

Date: April 24, 2002

To: Bob Canfield, Chair  
Emergency Management Committee

From: Rob Freeman, Division Chief  
Emergency Preparedness Department

Subject: **NEW YORK CITY POST-DISASTER RECONNAISSANCE TEAM REPORT**

### **Background**

On January 22 - 25, 2002, representatives from three Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) departments (EPD, Planning and DWP) traveled to New York City to attend a FEMA sponsored Urban Hazards Forum at the John J. College of Criminal Justice and to meet with local emergency management officials regarding their response to the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center disaster.

The Urban Hazards Forum was sponsored by FEMA and John J. College of Criminal Justice and covered terrorism preparedness, management of catastrophic events and disaster mitigation programs. Speakers included representatives from FEMA, New York State Emergency Management Office (SEMO), New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and faculty from John J. College and other institutions. Presentations focused on lessons learned from the World Trade Center response from a variety of perspectives. The forum provided information that will assist the City in evaluating its own preparedness and planning efforts regarding threats or acts of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and specific steps being taken to protect our community and mitigate the impact of similar disasters.

EOO representatives also had an opportunity to meet with staff from the City of New York Office of Emergency Management to discuss, in detail, their response to the World Trade Center disaster. Specific topics discussed included inter-agency coordination, planning and deployment of an alternate emergency operations center, emergency public information and media coordination, utilities management and restoration, crisis management and recovery and reconstruction efforts.

OEM staff were very helpful and gracious to the City's delegation, providing transportation assistance, meeting rooms, full access to their staff to answer questions, coordination of meetings with other agency representatives and a view of ground zero.

## **Lessons Learned**

The following is a summarized statement of our findings on lessons learned from the New York City visit.

### Inter-Agency and Inter-Jurisdiction Coordination and Cooperation

The New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) reported that inter-agency and inter-jurisdiction coordination and cooperation was effective in their response to the World Trade Center disaster. The New York City program is based on assignment of dedicated staff from various City agencies to OEM. More than seventy staff report directly to OEM including field responders who work at the incident level. OEM also worked closely with SEMO and FEMA under very difficult circumstances. A joint operations center for inter-agency coordination was established in the Pier 92 facility. During the height of the response effort more than 1000 staff representing over 100 agencies worked out of this center. Some agencies we spoke with did report they experienced problems in obtaining resources needed for response and recovery work.

### Urban Search and Rescue

The scope of urban search and rescue efforts was unprecedented. Twenty of the twenty-eight FEMA sponsored USAR teams responded including the L.A. City Fire Department (LAFD) team. This was one of the more well-publicized example of effective inter-agency coordination and mutual aid. The statement of findings from the OEM interview provides more detail. A copy of the LAFD after-action report prepared for FEMA is attached.

### Disaster Site and Perimeter Security

Many departments experienced problems with site and perimeter security, access and identification badging. Multiple and sometimes conflicting systems were used. Access to the ground zero site continues to be a problem for recovery efforts. Our delegation was able to visit ground zero with OEM escort.

### Alternate Emergency Operations Centers

The World Trade Center disaster destroyed the City's primary EOC. No plan was in place to have a ready back-up facility as an alternate EOC. OEM worked for three days to establish an alternate site at Pier 92 and was severely impacted by the lack of a back-up facility. They were fortunate to have strong support from City agencies and the private sector to set up the alternate site. OEM was scheduled to use The Pier 92 facility for a bio-hazard exercise on September 16, so it was a logical choice for an alternate EOC. OEM's current plans include identification of a short and long term primary EOC and a back-up site.

## Debris Removal and Environmental Issues

Environmental issues were and continue to be a major factor in response and recovery. There is ongoing disagreement between agencies regarding air quality at ground zero. Lack of personal protective equipment impeded local response. Availability of this equipment remains an issue for recovery efforts where crews are exposed to hazardous materials. Debris removal and management logistics were unprecedented in scope. This often impeded restoration of services with limited access to infrastructure for repairs

## Utilities Restoration

Local utilities were restored within eight days of the attack – very quick considering the scope of the damage. Work is ongoing to make permanent restoration efforts. Restoration of utilities was important for both business resumption and psychological reasons. Detailed notes regarding interviews with local utilities emergency managers are attached.

## Incident Command System (ICS)

Most of the local response agencies used ICS in their response to the disaster. Some agencies identified weaknesses in their use of ICS during their response and have increased their implementation and training programs since September 11, 2001.

## Emergency Public Information

The Joint Operations Center at Pier 92 also hosted a Joint Information Center for coordination of the media. OEM has a strong public information program and received top level support from the Mayor's Office. The Mayor's personal role in media relations was crucial. Working together, a team of PIOs provided timely information to the public and to the world about the response. The existence of a strong program in this area was of great help to the response and recovery effort.

## Crisis Management/Intervention

Effective crisis management was key to helping the responders cope with the nature and scale of the disaster. In the Urban Hazards Forum, in interviews with emergency managers and in conversation with local residents this topic came up time and time again. Clearly it remains a huge issue. The work of crisis management response teams to provide counseling to responders was and is critical. Almost six months after the disaster, crisis management services are still needed. Some agencies reported that they are no longer readily available and expressed concern about the long-term impact on responders.

## Recovery and Reconstruction

The City has a major effort ongoing to reconstruct the World Trade Center area. Several competing plans are under evaluation for redevelopment of the 16 acre site. Plans include provision for a permanent memorial while recognizing the economic recovery of the area.

## **Recommendations**

That the Emergency Management Committee (EMC) approve the following recommendations and forward them to the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) as an information item.

1. Direct the EMC Training Subcommittee to review the status of Citywide training of emergency management and response staff in the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) and to report back to the EMC at its July 3, 2002 meeting.
2. Direct the EMC Facilities Subcommittee to review the status of the City's Alternate EOC Program and its ability to support inter-agency coordination during a catastrophic events where there is a need for large-scale, multi-agency/multi-jurisdiction joint operations and to report back to the EMC at its July 3, 2002 meeting with specific strategies for meeting this need.
3. Direct the EMC Emergency Supplies Subcommittee to review the availability of personal protective equipment for emergency responders and to report back to the EMC at its July 3, 2002 meeting with a status report.
4. Direct the EMC Employee Welfare Subcommittee to review the status of Citywide crisis management and employee welfare programs available to City personnel following disasters and to report back to the EMC at its July 3, 2002 meeting with a status report.
5. Direct the EMC Media Task Force to review the current status of emergency public information coordination planning and to report back to the EMC at its July 3, 2002 meeting with a status report on whether these plans meet the City's needs for crisis communications during catastrophic events.
6. Direct the 2002 Emergency Management Workshop Planning Group to invite representatives from New York's OEM to present information on lessons learned at the 2002 Arrowhead Workshop.

Detailed reports of findings on the following issues are attached.

1. Emergency Management
2. Utilities Division (Power)
3. Utilities Division (Water)
4. Urban Search and Rescue

## **Attachment 1 - Emergency Management Report**

Emergency Operations Organization  
Delegation to New York City – Post 09/11/01 WTC Disaster  
January 21-25, 2002

### Notes From Meeting With NYC Office of Emergency Management (OEM)

On Tuesday, January 22, 2002, staff from the City of Los Angeles Emergency Operations Organization met with staff from the City of New York's Office of Emergency Management in their Pier 92 EOC facility to discuss their response and coordination efforts in the 09/11/01 WTC Disaster. Specific areas of interest included activation of the City's EOC at an alternate location and their plans for construction of a new facility.

#### Participants:

*Ellis M. Stanley, Sr.*, General Manager, City of Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Department  
*Robert B. Freeman*, City of Los Angeles Emergency Preparedness Department  
*Jean M. Prendergast*, City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power  
*Alta Shigeta*, City of Los Angeles Planning Department  
*John T. Odermatt*, First Deputy Director, City of New York OEM  
*Calvin Drayton*, Deputy Director, City of New York OEM  
*Edward Gabriel*, Deputy Director, City of New York OEM  
*Raymond M. Lynch*, Deputy Director, City of New York OEM, FEMA USAR TF1  
*Henry Jackson*, Deputy Director, City of New York OEM  
*Frank McCarton* ("Cookie"), Deputy Director, City of New York OEM  
*Richard Rotanz*, Deputy Director, City of New York OEM  
*Tim Brown*, Deputy Director, City of New York OEM  
*Michael Berkowitz*, City of New York OEM  
*Richard Shierer*, Commissioner, City of New York OEM

OEM staff made the following presentations:

#### First Deputy Director John Odermatt

OEM encompasses all City agencies, including Police, Fire, Sanitation, etc. They draw on these agencies for their expertise in emergency planning and response. OEM "takes a line" from these agencies, establishing a memorandum of understanding to move a position of authority and funding for them to work for OEM as an agency rep. "You become one of us." The Mayor has the legal authority to do this under the NYC charter. This provides OEM with a wealth of subject matter and field level expertise. Total OEM staff is 70. Only two of the positions are professional, civilian emergency managers. The others are sworn or agency reps with specific subject expertise.

OEM also has a close working relationship with local hospitals, VOADs and the private sector. When OEM lost its primary EOC in the WTC Disaster, they were able to call on the working relationships with these City and outside agencies to coordinate response, even in the absence of a physical EOC building. Within 36 hours they were able to establish an alternate EOC. Deputy Director Henry Jackson supervised the logistics of setting up the temporary facility.

WTC Building 7 housed the City's primary EOC. This facility was destroyed in the disaster. Staff were evacuated with no fatalities or injuries. OEM lost all of its computers and EOC equipment. All City agencies provided representatives to the alternate EOC that was established at Pier 92.

The Mayor's Directive provides the legal framework for agency participation in OEM. Initially some agencies were reluctant to provide representation, but most all support this system now. Odermatt spoke of the importance of full-time staffing. "Part time is no time." Private industry and utilities also have good working relationships with OEM, and both Con Ed and Verizon provide OEM with direct notification of outages to coordinate response.

On 09/11/01 the City lost its primary EOC. The EOC was activated immediately after the attack on the first tower, but was evacuated when the building became unstable. An alternate EOC facility was set up at a fire station but proved to be inadequate. The EOC was relocated to the Police Training Academy, which also proved to be too limited. A multi-agency incident command post was established at a local high school. Ultimately the alternate EOC was located in the Pier 92 facility because of its size, communications and logistics capabilities, location and security.

OEM has a total of 10 field response staff that respond to multi-agency incidents. OEM also has communications watch commanders that monitor all field response activities on a 24-hour basis to provide full-time planning and intelligence. OEM has close ties with the Port Authority but has had to work on this relationship. NYPD, FDNY, the NY Sheriff's Office, and Corrections provide a total of 25 staff to OEM Operations.

#### Deputy Director Richard Rotanz

Rotanz reported on how the alternate EOC was set up. OEM organized their EOC in accordance with the incident command system (ICS) with sections established for logistics, public information, planning and intelligence and liaison and operations. The operations section was divided into several branches including health, law enforcement, utilities, fire service, etc. The city had recently conducted a biological hazard/attack scenario exercise where all agencies participated. The EOC featured a raised podium where planning and intel functions as well as internal EOC facilities coordination was carried out. This allowed OEM staff to actually see the whole floor of the EOC. During the 09/11/02 activation, more than 130 federal, state and local government agencies sent representatives to the City's EOC. Total occupancy often approached 1,000 individuals. Eteam software was used to manage information in the EOC with over 1,000 users licensed.

### Deputy Director Edward Gabriel

Gabriel reported on the OEM Planning Division's activities with respect to public health issues. Major agencies like Public Health, local hospitals, Fire and Police have completed specialized chemical and biological incident first responder training. OEM serves as the liaison to state and federal resources.

OEM has a notification procedure with local hospitals regarding public health emergencies. They also maintain a cold weather and snow alert system to the community and send blast faxes to affected government agencies. OEM staffs a full-time surveillance system to monitor all available intel on public health emergencies, outbreaks of epidemics, hazardous materials incidents, etc. They monitor the 911 system and department radio frequencies to stay current on all potential health emergencies. They network with hospitals, pharmacies and all emergency response departments, especially those with public health divisions or functions. OEM maintains stockpiles of medications for use in public health emergencies to avoid reliance on federal resources and time delays in accessing those resources. OEM has developed specific plans for response to bio-terrorism incidents.

### Michael Berkowitz

Berkowitz did perimeter control and credentialing for ground zero. He reported briefly on perimeter security and i.d. issues and how that continues to be an issue as recovery efforts move forward. OEM coordinates this security process. They reported that it has gone well.

### Deputy Director Raymond Lynch

Lynch coordinates the City of New York's Urban Search and Rescue Response System and their Task Force 1 under FEMA. OEM sponsors the team. NYPD and FDNY mobilized teams for the 09/11/01 response. They staged resources at the Jacob Javits Convention Center. More than 20 USAR teams, including TF1, were mobilized for response to the WTC site. Teams spent an average of 10 – 14 days on site and rotated in and out. The US Forest Service provided sanitary facilities and meal service. Local fire and police resources were fully deployed during the WTC response. OEM worked with FEMA to allow USAR teams to perform local fire missions under FDNY authority. This allowed TF1 to join the USAR teams. OEM reported that they still have need for additional specialized USAR equipment.

At this point in the meeting, OEM Commissioner Richard Sheirer stopped in to say hello and meet Ellis Stanley. He did not provide a report to the delegation. Mr. Sheirer is the director of OEM and is appointed by the Mayor.



## Supervisor Tim Brown

Brown supervised field response activities for OEM. He has a staff of ten responders that roll out to major, multi-agency incidents. Their role is to provide a direct line of intelligence to the Mayor and OEM. The staff are sworn officers from Police and Fire who are assigned to OEM. They know the incident commanders and field level staff who respond to incidents and can easily integrate into the ICS structure as liaison officers. Fire and Police watch command decides when OEM will be called out to an incident. Typically they are called for incidents that involve multiple agencies, high profile media attention, politically sensitive issues or mass casualties.

## Deputy Director Henry Jackson

Jackson coordinates budget, personnel, information management and facilities support for OEM. He was responsible for establishing an alternate EOC when the primary facility at WTC building 7 was lost. Initially the EOC was moved to a fire station, which proved to be inadequate in terms of size and was too close to ground zero. Then the EOC was moved to the Police Academy. This also proved to be inadequate. OEM identified Pier 92 as a suitable site for the EOC because of its size, location and logistical capabilities. The Pier 92 facility had the electrical power and support capacity for large trade shows so was a good fit for a large, multi-agency joint operations center. Cable runs for voice and data were already in place. The existing infrastructure was capable of supporting up to 1,000 responders from hundreds of agencies.

OEM developed a good advance team to establish operations at Pier 92. This included staff for technology and infrastructure integration from private companies like Cisco and Motorola. They provided communications equipment as well as services for the EOC.

OEM plans to construct a new interim EOC and will also move forward to establish a permanent site. The old EOC facility had room for 75 responders and typically accommodated up to 100 people, which is similar in scope to the City of L.A.'s EOC. NYC OEM had no pre-determined plan for establishing an alternate EOC. When the primary facility was lost, OEM had no ready back-up facility and had to work to identify and establish one. They relied heavily on their good working relationships with many local, state and federal emergency response agencies as well as the private sector to make this happen. It took them 36 hours to get to Pier 92 and establish an alternate EOC. The alternate soon became more than just a City EOC. It was a multi-agency, inter-jurisdictional joint operations center for more than 100 federal, state and local agencies. The Mayor and his staff worked out of the EOC for several weeks during the response and initial recovery phase, which was done to ensure continuity of government and enable the Mayor to be closer to response activities.

Plans for the new EOC center on a capital improvement project to construct an 80,000 to 100,000 square foot, stand-alone, self-contained facility. It will not be located close to any major landmarks but will be in Manhattan. A thorough hazard and threat analysis is being conducted. Jackson anticipates an interim site will be established within 12 – 18 months.

## Deputy Director Frank McCarton

McCarton is OEM's public information officer. On 09/11/01, OEM's information center was destroyed. An alternate facility was established on Park Place so the Mayor and OEM staff could get word out to the media. Press conferences were held at the incident command post. Public information was a critical response element for OEM. Many residents were instructed on evacuation in place. Media pool cameras were established for lower Manhattan. Site access was a problem and OEM's PIO staff is extremely limited.

OEM relies on PIOs from various local agencies to work in similar fashion to the City of L.A.'s Media Task Force in terms of planning and exercising. A joint information center was set up in the Pier 92 EOC. A special pressroom was established. A pool camera was set-up in the EOC for a 24-hour feed. Fox network did most of this work for the City. The City's website was used to get information out to the public. OEM received up to 2,000 calls per day for the first 2 –3 weeks. The media effort was very successful. OEM coordinated with the Mayor's Office and their press deputy Matt Higgins. OEM staff felt the City handled media relations very effectively under extreme circumstances.

## **Attachment 2 - Utilities Division Report (Power)**

Emergency Operations Organization  
Delegation to New York City – Post 09/11/01 WTC Disaster  
January 21-25, 2002

### **Notes From Meeting With Con Ed**

On Friday, January 25, 2002, staff from the City of Los Angeles' Emergency Operations Organization met with emergency management staff from Con Ed at the City of New York's Office of Emergency Management Pier 92 EOC facility to discuss a list of specific questions regarding utilities issues (see attached.) Their responses have been organized into the following categories: overview of DEP's emergency management program, emergency response, inter-agency coordination, public information and customer service, recovery, new policies, and additional issues.

### **Participants:**

*Jean M. Prendergast*, Department of Water and Power, City of Los Angeles  
*Robert B. Freeman*, Emergency Preparedness Department, City of Los Angeles

*George Greenwood*, Vice President, Con Ed  
*Michael Spall*, Manager, Con Ed

### **Overview of Con Ed Emergency Management Program**

The Con Ed emergency management program includes two positions, a vice-president and a support staff position. George Greenwood is the Vice President. They rely on the New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) for inter-agency coordination. Con Ed's scope of services includes electrical power, gas and steam. Greenwood and Spall coordinate the company's emergency management policies. Spall is a former public information officer for Con Ed.

### **Emergency Response**

Con Ed uses the incident command system (ICS) in major events and disasters. They have established a corporate emergency response center (CERC), which was activated on 09/11/01 immediately following the WTC attack. The chain of command is clearly spelled out in the organization chart for the CERC, which is in accordance with ICS functions. During WTC events they also established a distribution command post, which included an information center for processing intelligence to the CERC.

Initially Con Ed was not a big player in the WTC response. They isolated services on WTC 1 and 2 and some ancillary buildings. They also established a field command post. This post

eventually had to be evacuated due to building collapses. Con Ed experienced one fatality during the 09/11/01 events.

Con Ed maintained two electrical sub stations in WTC building 7 which were lost as WTC 1 and 2 collapsed. Con Ed had to isolate the power to lower Manhattan. This affected a total of 5 electrical networks and 17,000 customers, most of them major buildings in the city's financial district and residences in the Battery Park area.

Con Ed organized their CERC by ICS functions including operations, planning and intelligence, public information, safety and liaison. Con Ed Vice Presidents served as the CERC Section Chiefs for operations, planning, etc. Briefings were held twice daily at 0800 and 1600 hours to handle policy and succession issues.

Situation assessment and damage assessment functions were done through the CERC and were then passed on to the EOC. Con Ed also performed resource status functions.

## **Key Issues**

1. During the disaster, Con Ed did not develop formal, written incident action plans. Management set goals during briefings and staff logged agency activities in the CERC. Documentation was not very good -- goals and objectives were not adequately disseminated. Con Ed plans to improve this process by formalizing the procedures for preparation and dissemination of written incident action plans in future emergencies.
2. Since 09/11/01, Con Ed has developed a better ICS organization chart for the CERC that specifies who performs what functions in an emergency. Position descriptions have been made more precise. Specific staff members have now been designated as Operations Chief, Planning Chief, etc. During 09/11/01 these appointments were made on the spot. Con Ed also felt that more precise field operational areas must be established for efficient response during disasters, and that planning for demobilization of field and CERC operations needs improvement.
3. At the field level, a total of 8 incident command posts were established. Electrical and gas field operations were managed at the ICP level with command posts established for each of these specific functions. The event was too large for a single ICP.
4. Security and safety on site were major issues, including air quality for responders. Personal protective equipment (PPE) including goggles, hard hats, and respirators, masks and communications devices were critical to the response effort.
5. Information and communications issues were also very important. Access to the Internet and email at the EOC and CERC was essential. Posting of hazard information at the site re: respirator requirements, location of hazards, etc was critical.

6. Site security and identification badges were a major issue. Access to the site was often problematic. Many different I.D. badges were used and were subject to change. This caused a good deal of confusion. Communication about the changes was often poor. Contractors had trouble accessing the site, as did Con Ed employees. Con Ed felt that the field level I.D. system established for this incident was not very effective.
7. During the disaster, top management walked the site each day to show support and talk to the crews. Con Ed felt that this helped employee morale and kept management informed about issues in the field.
8. Cellular phones and radios were used during the response but were subject to saturation. Nextel phones worked well. Verizon's corporate offices were destroyed in the disaster. They provided emergency use cellular phones. Landlines were re-established within 2 days.
10. Debris removal was a major issue for Con Ed crews, who had to handle some debris removal to continue service restoration activities.
11. The CERC needs to be opened more frequently for smaller events and for exercises to test the new ICS structure. A backup location for the CERC also needs to be established.

### **Inter-agency Coordination**

Con Ed strongly supports OEM and their centralized authority including the provision of "line" authorities for loaned positions from other agencies to OEM. Con Ed, however, does not provide a line authority to OEM. Con Ed had a staff presence at the OEM EOC and multi-agency field command posts.

### **Key Issues**

1. Portable generators were used to restore power in the affected area. 135 portable generators were obtained, mostly from private sources, and staged in New Jersey. The Army Corp of Engineers helped to deploy and set them up. New York's State Emergency Management Office (SEMO) was also called on to provide these resources. More than 90 of the generators were put into use. The Port Authority and NYPD helped to transport and deploy them.
2. Con Ed has a direct relationship with the State for reporting and requesting resources. Con Ed was able to go directly to SEMO for the portable generators, while keeping OEM informed of the requests.
3. The CERC has a logistics section, which has its own ICS structure and org chart for staffing. They have specific call-out lists for logistics responders. Con Ed requested many resources ranging from generators to personal protection equipment. They feel the need to improve arrangements with vendors and other agencies ahead of time.

4. The Red Cross, Salvation Army and OEM provided food for field crews. Private donations of goods were also made. They did not report on formal volunteer or mutual aid programs.
5. Con Ed called upon FDNY, OEM and Sanitation for debris removal of large objects.
6. Con Ed reported that inter-agency coordination dwindled as the incident wore on. The first two to three weeks cooperation was very good, then it declined.

### **Public Information and Customer Service**

Con Ed's PIO was very proactive. They called the media with information before they were asked to do so. Employees were given emergency information about available assistance and work locations. Although there was some duplication of information and miscommunication with the media as information was given out at the City's Joint Information Center (JIC) at the Pier 92 EOC, Con Ed felt good about the job they had done in getting info out to employees and the public.

### **Key Issues**

1. A toll free number was established for customer service updates. Con Ed's public affairs group coordinated the release of information. Con Ed experienced some problems with coordinating release of information through OEM. In one instance, Con Ed wanted to announce service restorations and OEM was not willing to release the info due to problems they thought would be caused by the release of that info.
2. Due to the WTC events, 6,000 gas customers and 8,000 steam customers were out of service. Initially, Con Ed told the Mayor it would take 6 weeks to restore services. Lower Manhattan was devastated and electrical power had to be restored to facilitate the response and clean-up effort. Restoration of power was also critical to show the public that the City could recover quickly and to enable the financial district to re-open. This was a political and economic imperative. Con Ed's chairman set the tone, and electrical, gas and steam services were restored in 8 days.
3. There was a need for customer service personnel at the EOC. Although the EOC is typically staffed with engineers, Con Ed was able to provide customer service representatives to the EOC to address customer questions and provide additional information to the EOC about how customers were being affected throughout the City.
4. Con Ed feels that public confidence is higher in the wake of the WTC disaster response. They participated in the ceremony to re-open the Stock Exchange and received kudos for their response and recovery efforts.
5. Con Ed customer operations maintains special accounts for big buildings and clients. They do a lot of public relations work for these accounts and have brought this into the

ICS structure. Customer service is an ICS function for Con Ed. Following the disaster, they set up a Con Ed Customer Service Center in Lower Manhattan.

## **Recovery**

Con Ed has a major recovery effort underway to make permanent service restoration to Lower Manhattan.

## **Key Issues**

1. Shunt boxes were set-up in the streets to cover temporary power lines. There is still a need to establish permanent lines. A total of 36 cable miles were laid. This will not handle summer period loads. As of 01/25/02, 75% of these temporary lines have been converted to permanent cabling.
2. The WTC disaster resulted in a loss of 90 MW of load. Another 100 MW in the surrounding area was affected. Although some insurance coverage is available for rebuilding the 2 substations, Con Ed pays for all of the response costs. No FEMA reimbursement is authorized. Con Ed estimates the cost of rebuilding the area at \$400 million.
3. Several hazard mitigation projects have been identified. OEM has been approached as a possible sponsor agency for FEMA mitigation funds. Projects would include improvements in emergency response and security.
4. Con Ed feels that there is a good deal of redundancy in the systems throughout Lower Manhattan. Con Ed wants to rebuild the 2 substations that they lost.
5. There are still environmental safety and access problems concerning the debris pile. Con Ed established a field office trailer for coordination of information regarding access to the site and ongoing repair work, roadwork, etc.
6. Con Ed stock prices have gone up. Con Ed's financial status is excellent, and they have a good bond rating. Some company cuts are being considered to recover the losses of 9/11/01.

## **New Policies**

Con Ed has developed the following new policies since 09/11/01:

1. Improvements were made in the ICS structure. Span of control was tightened up and a new organization chart established for emergency response. All management except the president and chairman are now given ICS roles. Senior VPs are established as Section Chiefs. Roles and responsibilities were clarified. The ICS chart went from a

business orientation of 15-16 boxes to an ICS orientation of 4-5 boxes with more precise position descriptions and guidelines.

2. A and B work shifts have now been established. This was a problem during the 09/11/01 response. Staff must now be on-call to respond, from the management to the field level. Con Ed's Emergency Management Staff coordinate the staffing plan, scheduling, training and drills. They use text paging to notify responders. Phone lists and call out lists have been updated since 9/11/01.
3. Staff from unaffected geographic divisions were assigned to the CERC for coordination of department resources. In this way, the staff responsible for the affected area can stay and do their primary jobs. Senior level staff is required to respond to the CERC for any citywide event such as a hurricane.
4. Although no major changes in operating procedures have been made since 09/11/01, Con Ed has since prepared a field operations guide (FOG) for field crews and CERC responders. The FOG information has been incorporated into Con Ed's ICS training, which all response staff must attend.



### **Attachment 3 - Utilities Division Report (Water)**

Emergency Operations Organization  
Delegation to New York City – Post 09/11/01 WTC Disaster  
January 21-25, 2002

#### **Notes From Meeting With Department of Environmental Protection**

On Friday, January 25, 2002, staff from the City of Los Angeles' Emergency Operations Organization met with emergency management staff from the City of New York's Department of Environmental Protection at the Office of Emergency Management Pier 92 EOC facility to discuss a list of specific questions regarding utilities issues. Their responses have been organized into the following categories: overview of DEP's emergency management program, emergency response, inter-agency coordination, public information and customer service, recovery, new policies, and additional issues.

#### **Participants:**

*Jean M. Prendergast*, Department of Water and Power, City of Los Angeles  
*Robert B. Freeman*, Emergency Preparedness Department, City of Los Angeles

*Douglas S. Greeley*, Deputy Commissioner  
Bureau of Water and Sewer Operations

*Paul Bennett*, Emergency Manager  
Bureau of Water and Sewer Operations

#### **Overview of Department of Environmental Protection Emergency Management Program**

Mr. Greeley provided an overview of the scope of services of the Department of Environmental Protection, specifically the Bureau of Water and Sewer Operations. The department provides water, sewer, treatment and distribution services to the 5 boroughs of New York. They maintain all system infrastructures and are responsible for managing capital improvement projects. They coordinate work with Con Ed and Verizon as other utility providers.

The Department is responsible for environmental compliance for the water distribution and sewage treatment systems, environmental enforcement for which they staff their own police force, hazardous materials management and response, noise sampling, conservation services, and customer services.

The water delivery system provides 1 – 2 billion gallons per day. They operate 6,800 miles of water mains, 110,000 fire hydrants and service 920,000 accounts and a total of 9 million customers. The department has a staff of 1280 and a capital construction budget of \$300 Million per year. They repair approximately 500 water main breaks per year.

Paul Bennett heads the Department's Office of Emergency Management and coordinates emergency response, planning and mitigation for disasters and planned events. He manages inter-agency coordination and is the liaison with public officials. The department's emergency management program is five years old and is part of New York's citywide emergency management program.

### **Emergency Response**

DEP local maintenance yard crews responded to the first call within 10-15 minutes of the first attack on WTC 1. They responded to an interagency command post and inspected standpipes, nozzles and water supply. Radio communications were established. Eight or nine crewmembers were on scene at that time. Following the second attack, radio communications became a problem. One crewmember was left on scene following the evacuation and received minor injuries. All others made it out safely although there was a period of time where department management was not sure of their status due to communication failures.

Following the second attack, the area was locked down. The transit system was shut down for six hours. DEP asked OEM for access to the site to continue field response. Their mission was to isolate and secure the water system. They encountered difficulties getting access to the site although they were asked to provide resources to other response agencies, including pumps, generators, jackhammers, cones, safety gear, etc. These resources were requested and coordinated by OEM and transported to the site.

At the field level, DEP feels that staff is familiar with their specific response roles. DEP does not currently provide a line authority to the City's Office of Emergency Management.

### **Key Issues**

1. At the WTC site DEP crews encountered huge amounts of debris that needed to be moved to gain access to the water facilities. They surveyed the site, removed debris from catch basins and other locations and began restoration efforts.
2. The entire water distribution system for Lower Manhattan was impacted. DEP crews were able to access the site at 1800 hours on 09/11/01. At that time the system could provide only 18 psi for fire suppression. DEP used four 2-person inspection teams to respond, supported by 12 managerial staff positions. 2 valve teams were also dispatched. Water pressure was brought back to normal levels by 0100 hours on 09/12/01. Eight to ten water mains were broken with diameters ranging from 8 to 20 inches. 150 large customers were out of service. Service was restored within 10 days.
3. There was great concern over dust migrating from the site. Water trucks were brought in for dust suppression. DEP air monitoring stations were set up. Catch basins were cleaned.

4. A mobile command vehicle was brought into the area as a mobile command post to manage resource requests and serve as the coordination point for DEP field activities.
5. DEP responded to several broken mains on 9/11. They also performed leak detection missions for the subway system.
6. DEP lost 7 vehicles in the collapse of the WTC buildings.
7. The constant flow of dump trucks made it difficult for DEP to complete their work in the street.
8. DEP used heavy equipment, repaired cracked manhole covers, had to deal with damage to response vehicles and experienced access problems when trying to repair line breaks.
9. DEP reported significant confusion and coordination problems with the relocation of the City EOC after the collapse. The EOC was relocated from WTC building 7 to a local fire station and then to the Police Academy, before a final site was selected at Pier 92.
10. DEP reported major problems with the command structure at the field level. They were often unsure as to who was in charge, since FDNY, OEM and others all asserted leadership roles. There were disagreements at the incident command post level about this issue.

### **Interagency Coordination**

Although DEP felt overall that inter-agency coordination was good, they did experience some significant problems in this area.

### **Key Issues**

1. DEP had trouble with many of their resource requests to the City EOC, specifically in getting emergency purchase order approvals. Requests to OEM from DEP were not expedited, while DEP was asked to provide resources to other agencies and did so. DEP felt EOC logistics efforts were ineffective and arbitrary.
2. Local vendors offered to provide resources. Verizon provided cellular telephones. Other resources included tools, contractor services, and safety gear and work clothes.
3. Ongoing access to ground zero remains a problem for DEP. They experienced quite a bit of frustration in this area throughout the response and the crews continue to have difficulty accessing portions of the damaged area where they are expected to perform missions to restore services.

## **Public Information and Customer Service**

DEP's emergency management office coordinated public information during the WTC disaster. They worked with OEM and other agencies and reported the following issues.

### **Key Issues**

1. DEP performed air sampling and provided data to the Health and Safety Advisory Committee who disseminated the data. There was confusion on the part of the public regarding air quality in the area, which DEP felt was not reported accurately. There was also confusion among the agencies (EPA, OEM, DWP) as to which agency was responsible to provide public information on this topic.
2. DEP reported that they believe customer confidence has increased since 09/11/01 because customer expectations of timely restoration were met during the response for these events.

## **Recovery**

Business recovery was a major concern. DEP was already engaged in a water main capital improvement project to repair leaks in the Wall Street area. They were performing mitigation work to replace piping at the time of the 09/11/01 attack. Water mains at the WTC were already slated for replacement and the funding was in place. The project was underway and was budgeted for \$22 million. FEMA had funded some of this project.

### **Key Issues**

1. DEP was especially concerned about the WTC "bathtub", which is the protective wall that separates the area from the river. There was concern that if the bathtub failed, the area would be flooded with river water and the damage would be much more extensive.
2. Roof top water tanks were drained and refilled since the tanks were exposed to the dust caused by the collapse of the buildings.
3. DEP's bond rating remains strong, as does investor confidence. DEP maintained good customer relations and assisted businesses to recover. The response costs were approximately \$60 million.

## **New Policies**

DEP has undertaken the following new policies as a result of their experience in the WTC disaster.

1. Security improvements have been made to the water system. Access to the watershed

has been limited. Dam security measures have been increased and facilities tours discontinued. Security access for outside contractors and vendors has been tightened up and the DEP police force expanded. They have increased the security of chemicals and hazardous materials. Some changes have also been made in specific chemicals used.

2. DEP has a \$35 million contract with the US Army Corps of Engineers to do a vulnerability assessment of the water distribution system to determine the potential risks following 09/11/01.
3. DEP now has their intrusion alarm system tied directly to NYPD 911 operators. NYPD has been briefed on the nature of DEP facilities. Review of facility security measures is ongoing.
4. DEP has revised their communications plan to include cel phones and 800 MHz radios for greater redundancy. During the WTC disaster, the radio system worked well, but got very crowded, and OEM shut them down for a period of time. Nextel phones/radios also worked well.

### **Additional Issues**

DEP felt that they were prepared for the 09/11/01 disaster. They emphasized the importance of crisis management and psychological counseling services for responders. NYPD and FDNY brought in personnel to provide these services. DEP made use of them but noted that there was still a need for counseling services, as many employees clearly continue to be affected by the events of 09/11/01. Crisis management remains a major issue for DEP.

## **Attachment 4 - Urban Search and Rescue Report**

January 7, 2002

Chief Dave Webb  
Federal Emergency Management Agency  
500 "C" Street SW, Room 609  
Washington, D.C. 20472

Dear Chief Webb,

As a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, the Los Angeles Fire Department Urban Search and Rescue Task Force (CA-TF 1) was deployed to this incident from September 11 to September 21, 2001.

Upon the return of CA-TF 1 to Los Angeles, a team was formed to prepare the required reports and documentation as required by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). As a result of meetings and conference calls coordinated by the California Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES), a workable format has been developed to capture activities and experiences of CA-TF 1, identify the issues and recommendations to FEMA as a result of this deployment, and address the role of the OES during this time period.

Attached is the After Action Report for the World Trade Center Incident. The fiscal information regarding personnel and equipment expenses for this deployment will be forwarded to your Office in the near future.

Thank you for your on-going support and commitment to the Urban Search and Rescue program. If you have any questions regarding this report please feel free to contact me at (213) 485-6093.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM R. BAMATTRE  
Fire Chief

DEAN E. CATHEY, Assistant Chief  
Bureau of Emergency Services

DEC:gw

# WORLD TRADE CENTER INCIDENT

## AFTER ACTION REPORT

CA-TF 1

LOS ANGELES FIRE DEPARTMENT

URBAN SEARCH AND RESCUE  
TASK FORCE

*William R. Bamattre*  
*Fire Chief*

## **FEMA After Action Report**

November 14, 2001

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### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

On September 11, 2001, at 0848 hours (Eastern Daylight Time) American Airlines Flight 11, a Boeing 767 Jetliner enroute from Boston's Logan Airport to Los Angeles crashed into Tower 1, the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City. Approximately eighteen minutes later, at 0906 hours, a second jet, United Airlines Flight 175, hit Tower 2, the south tower. The upper floors of the 110 story twin towers burned until, at 0959 hours, the South Tower collapsed. At 1024 hours, the North Tower also collapsed. Initial reports indicated that thousands of building occupants and hundreds of emergency responders were inside the buildings when they collapsed.

The collapse of the Twin Towers caused Building 7 of the World Trade Center to burn and collapse. Ultimately, the entire sixteen-acre complex was destroyed due to building collapse, structure failures, or fire. Damage to the surrounding area extended up to a mile in each direction.

At the same time, a fully loaded passenger jet crashed into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. This incident resulted in a major fire that burned inside the building for over 24 hours. The Incident Commander at the Pentagon suspected that hundreds of workers were trapped inside the structure.

As these events unfolded, carried live on all television stations, it quickly became clear that the United States was under attack from unknown terrorists. In Los Angeles, City Officials and most residents suspected that the attacks would continue and that Los Angeles would be the next target.

The City of Los Angeles took action to prepare for such an attack. The Emergency Operations Center was activated at the highest level of response (Level III). The Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) recalled the off-going platoon, doubling the on-duty staffing level. Reserve fire apparatus and Emergency Medical Service (EMS) resources were activated. At the same time it became clear that the World Trade Center and Pentagon incidents would require massive search and rescue efforts.

Prior to the official notification of activation from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES), the Los Angeles Fire Department's Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Unit began a call out of qualified personnel to staff California Task Force 1 (CA-TF 1).

A verbal activation order was received at 1200 hours (Pacific Daylight Time). The official order was received by FAX at 1412 hours. A total of 70 members were rostered.



At 1600 hours CA-TF 1 departed LAFD Fire Station 88 for March Air Force Base (AFB). California Task Force Six (CA-TF 6) from Riverside was also at March Air Force Base, and together, both Task Forces and their equipment were transported in three C-141 aircraft to Mc Guire Air Force Base in New Jersey. Several Incident Support Team (IST) members accompanied the first flight out of March AFB.

By 0600 hours on September 12, 2001, CA-TF 1 was assembled at Mc Guire AFB, prepared for deployment to New York. At 1400 hours, CA-TF 1 departed Mc Guire AFB for the Jacob Javitz Convention Center in New York, the Base of Operations (BoO). CA-TF 1 arrived at 1800 hours and established a BoO.

On September 13, 2001 a "Forward BoO" was set up three blocks south of the World Trade Center, at 110 Washington Street, in a building undergoing renovation. The loading ramp and dock were ideal for this purpose. The vacant floor being renovated provided ideal conditions for our purposes.

At 1500 hours on September 13, 2001 CA-TF 1 began initial search and recon missions. For the next nine days, missions were assigned from the IST, which included search, rescue, and body recovery missions primarily in the areas south and west of the South Tower. These locations were initially designated as Sectors "Liberty West", then "Liberty", then "10-10". The majority of the missions were search operations alone, or in coordination with FDNY and/or other FEMA US&R Task Forces.

Specific actions included:

- Canine search
- Technical search of void spaces
- Physical search of deep, extensive voids
- Perimeter building searches
- Light debris removal with FDNY
- FDNY support
- Continuous effort by Task Force Leaders to educate FDNY Commanders of the US&R Task Force capability, and develop effective liaisons with these officers

"Live" alerts by the search canines occurred during the first four days of operation, however, no live rescues were made. CA-TF 1 participated in the recovery of approximately 30 to 35 bodies or portions of bodies.

On September 18, 2001, the (IST) issued a demobilization order for CA-TF 1. The final operational period worked by CA-TF 1 ended at 1900 hours on September 19, 2001.

The cache was repackaged in preparation for travel to Fort Dix/Mc Guire AFB. At 1300 hours on September 20, 2001 the cache was loaded on trailers and CA-TF 1 was enroute to Fort Dix/Mc Guire AFB in New Jersey.

On September 21, 2001 at 1330 hours, the personnel of CA-TF 1 departed Mc Guire AFB aboard a commercial Boeing 757. The cache was transported by a commercial carrier, separate from CA-TF 1 personnel. At 1845 hours (PDT) CA-TF 1 arrived at LAFD Fire Station 88 for a homecoming ceremony. At 2000 hours on September 21, 2001 the deployment to the World Trade Center concluded.

Post incident activities include the Critical Incident Stress Management protocols for families and CA-TF 1 members. Rehab of the cache began on September 24, 2001. A team has been assembled to complete this after action report and conduct an extensive after action review to capture the lessons learned from this deployment.

## **INTRODUCTION**

CA-TF 1 was deployed for a total of 10.5 twenty-four hour days from the time our Task Force began the mobilization process at 0800 hours on September 11, 2001 until CA-TF 1 arrived back at LAFD Fire Station 88 on September 21, 2001 at 2000 hours.

After establishing a Base of Operations (BoO) at the Jacob Javitz Convention Center, CA-TF 1 first traveled to the World Trade Center Site during the afternoon of September 13, 2001. A "Forward BoO" was established at 110 Washington Street, in vacant commercial space on the first floor of a Condominium Building. The space was under renovation and served the purpose for the Forward BoO.

CA-TF 1 missions began at that time and continued through 1900 hours on September 19, 2001.

The majority of CA-TF 1 missions were in the area south of the South Tower or the levels below 5 World Trade Center. Mission assignments included:

- Recon/search of the sector south of the South Tower
- Search of buildings adjacent to the World Trade Center
- Debris and void searches south of the South Tower
- Void searches adjacent to 90 West, a high rise building southwest of WTC Tower 2 – accessed through the basement stairway
- Canine searches, both live and cadaver, throughout the debris field.

These missions varied from CA-TF 1 working alone, or in conjunction with other FEMA US&R Task Forces, FDNY, New York Police Department Emergency Services Unit, and military personnel.

## **CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS**

### **ALERT**

CA-TF 1 was not placed on alert.

### **ACTIVATION**

The written order was at 1445 hours that afternoon.

Battalion Chief Thomas M. Burau, Commander of the LAFD Special Operations Section, received a verbal activation order on September 11, 2001 at 1200 hours. The written activation order received via FAX from OES to the LAFD Operations Control Dispatch Section later the same day, at 1445 hours.

### **MOBILIZATION**

Prior to the official notification from OES, preliminary steps were taken by the US&R Unit to facilitate a mobilization of CA-TF 1. When the mobilization order was received, personnel were in place to begin the call-out process.

The mobilization was one of many significant activities complicated by the ongoing concern that Los Angeles would be the next terrorism target. In fact, the Los Angeles Fire Department held the off-going platoon and staffed additional fire and EMS resources. The Emergency Operations Center was staffed at Level III activation. Additional Command Officers were assigned to each LAFD Division ready to implement Area Command(s), as needed. Clearly there were many activities taking place in addition to the task of mobilizing CA-TF 1.

CA-TF 1 was recently designated as a Weapons of Mass Destruction US&R Task Force. A total of 70 members were processed and transported to March Air Force Base. The cache was transported to the point of Departure (POD) without incident. Personnel were transported by two motor coaches, with California Highway Patrol Escort, to the POD.

By 1610 hours, personnel and the cache were enroute to March AFB.

At 1750 hours, CA-TF 1 arrived at March AFB.

While 70 members reported to March Air Force Base, loadmasters would only allow 66 members to travel, citing weight and fuel issues. Ironically, three C-141 aircraft were used to move CA-TF 1 and CA-TF 6. The first plane was just over one half full of personnel with very little of the cache included, while the remaining C-141's were packed with equipment and personnel.

Proper planning on the part of Air Force personnel would have allowed all 70 CA-TF 1 personnel to remain together as a complete Task Force.

At 1920 hours four members of CA-TF 1 were sent home from March AFB.

At 2050 hours half of CA-TF 1 and half of CA-TF 6, along with IST members took off in the first C-141. The remainder of the two task forces, with the caches, took off 90 minutes later.

At 0420 (EDT) hours on September 12, 2001 CA-TF 1 landed at Mc Guire AFB. Personnel were fed and moved to various locations around the base until 1445 hours, when transportation to New York was arranged.

At 1800 hours, CA-TF 1 arrived at the Jacob Javitz Convention Center and by 2130 hours, the BoO was established.

### ON-SITE OPERATIONS

CA-TF 1 set up a Forward BoO at 110 Washington Street.

Assignments during the deployment of CA-TF 1 were primarily in the area south of the World Trade Center, East of the complex, or below WTC 5. Canine search operations targeting both live victims and cadavers were conducted throughout the area.

Assignments included:

- Canine and technical search
- Void space searches
- Technical rescue/removal of bodies
- Building searches in surrounding structures
- Structure inspection for safety and stability
- Roof-top searches
- Debris removal
- Command Post construction (10-10 Command Post Work Tables, scaffolding)

## DEMOBILIZATION

The demobilization order was received on September 18, 2001 at 1500 hours from the IST at the Javitz Center. CA-TF 1 was directed to end Search and Rescue operations at the World Trade Center at 1900 hours on September 19, 2001.

On September 20, 2001 CA-TF 1 was transported to and billeted at Fort Dix/Mc Guire AFB.

On September 21, 2001 CA-TF 1 personnel were flown home on a chartered commercial jet with CA-TF 3 and CA-TF 6. The caches for these Task Forces were flown home separately on a commercial cargo carrier.

CA-TF 1's mission was complete at 2000 hours on September 21, 2001.

## Family Support Unit

The LAFD US&R Unit Commander, along with two support personnel, made contact with a family member of all 66 task force members and the LAFD IST Team members each day of the deployment.

The LAFD Fire Chief mailed a communication "From the Office of the Fire Chief..." to each family of the deployed members, describing the mission, the make up of the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force, and the efforts that the Department would initiate to support families and keep them informed of events in New York. One of the methods to inform the families was a recorded telephone message, which was updated on a daily basis. The phone number for this information tape was only provided to families.

Several Department members offered to help in any way possible. These members were placed on a roster and enlisted for family support. Emergency home repairs and assistance with travel arrangements are examples of the assistance provided.

In one case, family members of a deployed member were used for emotional support of another deployed member's children who were experiencing problems dealing with the terrorist attacks and the absence of their father.

The LAFD is evaluating this model of family support for other events, such as the deployment of Strike Teams or other mutual aid resources to brush fires or other major incidents out of the City for extended periods.

## POST MISSION ACTIVITIES

The homecoming ceremony was a major media event, attended by California Governor Gray Davis, Los Angeles Mayor James K. Hahn, and many other local politicians. CA TF-1 member's families were asked to arrive two hours prior to the expected return of CA-TF 1 for an orientation to the homecoming events and a family de-briefing session. The LAFD Critical Incident Stress Management Coordinator assembled team members from the Los Angeles City and County Fire Departments to address family members in small groups. Handouts were provided for reference.

CA-TF 1 members were allowed 72 hours for re-hab before returning to work.

Re-hab of the cache began immediately by team members who did not participate in the deployment. The cache was decontaminated, a complete inventory was taken, and orders were placed for the purchase of equipment expended, damaged, and/or lost. Equipment, materials and supplies that were ordered continue to be received.

CA-TF 1 was made available for deployment on October 8, 2001.

Although CA-TF 1 is available for deployment, work on the cache continues, as replacement items are received. To date, over 900 personnel hours have been committed to cache re-hab. FEMA funded 400 hours for rehab of the cache.

A team has been assembled to complete the after action report. Work began within one week of CA-TF 1's return to Los Angeles. On November 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup>, 2001, California OES sponsored a meeting of Task Force Leaders and Finance / Accounting personnel to receive instruction regarding after-action and fiscal reporting issues.

When the FEMA After Action report is complete, the team will address a historical report and internal review of actions taken and lessons learned. This will include a mission debriefing to be scheduled in January 2002.

## EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS

The structure and make up of the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Force provided the flexibility to address the multitude of tasks required at this incident. The majority of missions were really search missions. The search element was supported by a rescue squad and technical specialists and functioned very effectively.

The call out procedure worked well due to the initiative and willingness of the Special Operations Section and US&R Unit Commanders to initiate the call out prior to the official notification from FEMA and OES. It was clear that Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces would be called to this incident from around the country.

Operating procedures were virtually paralyzed by the inability to coordinate US&R operations with local agencies. This does not reflect on the organization of the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Force, but on the lack of understanding by FDNY Commanders who did not employ this resource effectively.

The "stand alone" configuration of the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Force was important in this deployment. The incident and the IST were unable to support the needs of CA-TF 1 for the first four days for items other than shelter, transportation and food while at the BoO. Food and water brought with the cache was taken to the Forward BoO and sustained the members during deployment periods.

Prior training was beneficial for those positions where training curriculum and doctrine are in place.



## **LESSONS LEARNED**

### **ISSUE**

CA-TF 1 was first up in the rotation during the month of September. The Los Angeles Fire Department took the initiative to begin the mobilization process, based on the high probability of activation. When the verbal activation order was received at 1200 hours, the mobilization process was well under way.

OES duty officers called different locations within the Department with conflicting information regarding the decision to activate, which caused confusion, but the mobilization continued.

### **Recommendation**

Prior to this activation, the LAFD point of contact for OES was the Operations Control Dispatch Section Commander. This has now been changed to include the Special Operations Section and Urban Search and Rescue Unit Commanders, who will share information with the OCDS Commanders and Department management.

### **ISSUE**

CA-TF 1 had been designated as a Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Urban Search and Rescue Task Force. When the activation order was received a team of 70 was rostered to staff the positions assigned to a WMD Urban Search and Rescue Task Force. At March Air Force Base, the Task Force Leaders were notified that only 66 members would be transported due to weight restrictions.

Ultimately, two C-141 aircraft transported CA-TF 1, CA-TF 6, and IST personnel. The first plane to depart was just over one half full and could have easily accommodated the members of CA-TF 1 who were turned away. This caused confusion and stress to the Task Force Leaders and particularly to the Haz Mat Technicians who were not allowed to continue on the mission.

The Department of Defense (DOD) must realize that the 70 member Task Force must be transported as a whole; the US&R Task Force cannot afford to leave personnel or equipment behind.

The cost of rostering the four members who were later turned away and the time to pack and unpack personal protective equipment is significant to the local agency.

### Recommendation

It is recommended that FEMA adopt a policy regarding WMD Urban Search and Rescue Task Force staffing must be consistent and clearly communicated to the Department of Defense. CA-TF 1 is now a 70 member WMD US&R Task Force, not a 62 member Task Force. Consideration and procedures should be established for the additional personnel and larger equipment cache in determining transportation needs.

### ISSUE

When CA-TF 1 arrived at Mc Guire AFB there were no preparations or arrangements made for our arrival. Valuable hours were wasted while CA-TF 1 stood by and was relocated several times. Nearly ten hours after landing at Mc Guire AFB, CA-TF 1 was finally transported to New York City.

CA-TF 1 members had virtually dropped everything and immediately responded, mobilized and traveled to March AFB. All members had seen the buildings collapse on television and were determined to rescue those trapped in and below the debris.

In the past, the DOD was responsible for transportation to the impact area. The self-sufficient nature of the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force allows the search and rescue operations to begin while the IST is assembled and established within the Incident Command System.

The delays caused frustration, and eroded any confidence that task force members had in the management and support of the US&R mission.

### Recommendation

It is recommended that the DOD be charged with the responsibility to rapidly transport Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces to the impact area without waiting for the IST or other ICS elements that may or may not be established to make such arrangements.

### ISSUE

The Base of Operations at the Jacob Javitz Convention Center was not adequate for an extended mission. The lights and noise prevented Urban Search and Rescue Task Force members working twelve-hour operational periods from getting proper rest. Fatigue and sleep deprivation became major safety issues.

### Recommendation

It is recommended that a BoO be selected that will provide quiet areas for personnel rehab and sleep

### ISSUE

The Food Unit was highly satisfactory at the concession stands inside the Javitz Convention Center. When the USFS Overhead team and Food Unit contractor arrived, the dining area was moved outside of the Convention Center, to a remote corner of the parking lot, far from the assigned areas for the Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces. The quality of the food was much worse than the concession stands that were utilized initially. Time that could have been better used by the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force members (for rest and re-hab) was spent walking to the remote area set up for the food unit.

### Recommendation

It is recommended that all Food Unit considerations be examined and re-evaluated to assure that decisions effectively support incident personnel.

### ISSUE

Transportation from the BoO to the site was always late, causing delays, confusion, and frustration. Coordination of military escorts in the first few days of the mission was non-existent, although direction from the IST was for the US&R Task Force to wait at the loading dock for security escorts.

CA-TF 1 often took the initiative to "recruit" an escort after multiple trips to the IST (at the opposite end of the convention center) failed to provide the required escort.

### Recommendation

It is recommended that FEMA include in Logistics an Agency Rep from the military who has the authority to assign escorts, and adequate resources to escort the assigned Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces.

## ISSUE

The FDNY Incident Commander(s) and line officers virtually ignored the FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces. There was no interface between Incident Commanders and Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, no common communications, and no spirit of teamwork.

Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces were never allowed to work alone and perform to the optimum level. All operations required approval from FDNY line officers, who did not understand the capabilities of the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force.

## Recommendation

It is recommended that FEMA develop a briefing package that can quickly educate the Incident Commander regarding the capabilities of the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force and how to properly utilize this resource.

## ISSUE

FDNY Incident Commanders would not give IST representatives appropriate assignments for Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces. The removal of debris by heavy equipment was no reason to stop US&R operations, which could have easily continued near the center of the debris field, away from the cranes and heavy equipment. Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces were forced to "stand by" until the heavy equipment operators took a break once every two to three hours, and limit search activities to 15 to 20 minute periods during these breaks.

## Recommendation

It is recommended that FEMA develop a briefing package that can quickly educate Incident Commanders regarding the capabilities of the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force and how to properly utilize this resource.

## ISSUE

There was no continuity of missions between operational periods. Work that had progressed at a reasonable rate was abandoned while the platoon reporting for work had to wait for the FDNY Sector Incident Commander to decide if the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force would even get a chance to work.

## Recommendation

It is recommended that FEMA develop a briefing package that can quickly educate the Incident Commander regarding the capabilities of the Urban Search and Rescue Task Force and how to properly utilize this resource.

## ISSUE

Twice during the deployment, Urban Search and Rescue Task Force members were required to stand in line for over an hour, each time, for FEMA ID Cards. Urban Search and Rescue Task Force members who had been working 12 hour operational periods, plus over one hour to be transported back to the BoO, decon, shower, and eat, then had to stand in line for over one hour for an ID Card. Two different ID Cards were issued, two days apart.

Sleep deprivation was a major safety concern to Task Force Leaders and Safety Officers. The Urban Search and Rescue Task Force members felt that this ID Card issue was another needless insult, along with the poor sleeping arrangements and Food Unit (already mentioned).

## Recommendation

IST members are almost exclusively US&R Task Force members. As such, the IST needs to be sensitive to rest and rehabilitations needs when planning security, feeding and transportation issues.

It is also recommended that FEMA consider an ID card for the Task Force Leaders, who will represent and identify members of their respective US&R Task Force.

## ISSUE

Cache rehab hours far exceeded the 400 hours authorized by FEMA. The actual number of hours needed to decon the tools, equipment, and boxes, inventory the cache, fix, repair, adjust, tune-up, et.al the thousands of items of the cache cannot be determined by FEMA prior to leaving the incident. In this case, an arbitrary figure of 400 hours was authorized for cache rehab.

400 hours is not adequate for cache rehab. The actual cache rehab hours for CA-TF 1 currently stand at 965, and will increase as equipment is received that must be inventoried, placed in the correct box and palletized.

## Recommendation

It is recommended that cache rehab hours be based on actual hours expended.

## ISSUE

After Action Reporting procedures are inconsistent. The FEMA Guidelines in the US&R operational Manual are very generic and do not reflect updated issues that impact on existing employment law and individual Memoranda of Agreement (MOA). For example, CA-TF 1 and FEMA have an MOA that allows \$24.00 per hour for Canine Specialists, yet when invoices were prepared it came to our attention that this hourly rate was impacted by the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Canine Specialists were subsequently paid time and one half for all hours over and above 40 hours per week.

## Recommendation

It is recommended that FEMA expedite efforts with US&R Task Force Leaders or representatives to address and/or update the MOA's to provide uniformity, consistency, and updated compliance with laws and regulations that affect US&R Task Forces.

## **EVALUATION OF OES SUPPORT**

### **Liaison**

Assistant Chief Len Chesmore provided support as the Agency Rep from OES. During the activation and mobilization process he was in frequent contact with the LAFD US&R Unit.

Because LAFD Canines were in Washington for a Canine Specialist Training Class, Chief Chesmore was instrumental in acquiring three additional canines through the mutual aid system.

### **Guidance**

OES became the advocate for California Task Forces deployed to New York. FEMA and the IST failed to provide MRE's for CA-TF 1. Back in Los Angeles, the US&R Unit Commander attempted to order these items and was told to wait and allow the incident to provide food. Two days later, when the incident still had not provided MRE's, OES lobbied the IST for help and authorized the order.

### **Briefings, Conference Calls**

OES conducted a daily conference call for all California US&R Task Forces. The value of these calls was for the Departments with Task Forces deployed but also for those about to be deployed.

### **ISSUE**

The conference calls lasted over 90 minutes. Departments with Task Forces deployed were overwhelmed with activity, and the commitment of 90 minutes took valuable time.

The notes from the conference calls provided valuable historical perspective, but each Department came away with a slightly different perspective and outcome from the call.

OES referred to or reviewed documents during the conference calls that were not readily available to all participants.

### Recommendation

It is recommended that OES fax the agenda, documents that will be reviewed, and Intel notes to each conference call participant prior to the call to help compress the call time.

OES, when staffing is available, should transcribe and distribute the notes from the conference call to all participating agencies to provide consistency and to assist those who could not talk and take notes at the same time.

### ISSUE

The US&R Unit Commander participated in the conference calls, but was never sure of who was on the line, listening to sensitive information.

### Recommendation

It is recommended that OES develop security measures to insure secure conference calls.

### **OES - Intel Operations Unit**

The US&R Unit Commander provided daily briefing papers to LAFD management and Public Information Officers. This information came from Task Force Leaders in New York, and the OES conference calls.

### ISSUE

Conflicting information was received.

Information was released that caused concern to FDNY administration.

### Recommendation

OES is in the best position to be a "clearing-house" for incident information and particularly to control information that should not be released.

### **Support Documentation**

OES continues to provide FEMA information and forms to CA-TF 1.