

AGENDA

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE Wednesday, November 1, 2006 9:00 a.m. EOB Room, P- 4 Level, City Hall East

I. Call to Order, Introductions, Approval of Minutes

II. Subcommittee Reports and Planning Teams

- Budget - Rob Freeman
- Community Preparedness - Carol Parks
- Fire / Life Safety - Richard Wuerth / Lourdes Morales
- Human Resources - Bobbi Jacobsen
- Information Technology - Rita Khurana-Carwile
- Logistics - Richard Pineda
- NIMS / NRP Integration Task Force - Rob Freeman
- Operations - Chris Ipsen
- Planning - Larry Meyerhofer
- Recovery and Reconstruction - Rob Freeman
- Training - Alen Pijuan
- Others

III. New Emergency Operations Center (Prop Q) - Rob Freeman

IV. 2006 Emergency Management Workshop - Rob Freeman

V. May 1, 2006 Immigration Protests After Action Report - Chris Ipsen

VI. July 24-26, 2006 Heat Wave After Action Report - Chris Ipsen

VII. Homeland Security Grant Update - Felipe Perez

VIII. Old / New Business

IX. Adjournment

Refreshments to be provided by the Personnel Department.

EMC MEETING INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE ON THE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DEPARTMENT WEBSITE AT www.lacity.org/epd - CLICK ON Emergency Operations Organization, then EMC.

If you would like to be added to the EMC email distribution list, please send an email to erricka.jordan@lacity.org or contact Erricka Jordan (213) 978-0544.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

Date: October 25, 2006

To: Anna Burton, Chair
Emergency Management Committee

From: Chris Ipsen, Division Chief
Operations Division

Subject: **MAY 1, 2006 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) ACTIVATION**

On May 1, 2006, the City's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated in planned response to the Immigration Reform. Attached is the After Action Report (AAR) outlining dates and times, responding departments, actions and recommendations for corrective actions.

The Emergency Preparedness Department (EPD) is now responsible for completing all EOC activation AARs. The attached report is submitted to the Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) Emergency Management Committee (EMC) for approval with the recommendation that it be forwarded to the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) for its approval.

EPD will track recommendations for improvement and, as appropriate, report back to the EMC.

Attachment

Cl:ol



**After Action Report
May 1, 2006
Immigration Reform Demonstration
EOC Activation**



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Homeland security preparedness involves a cycle of outreach, planning, capability development, training, exercising, actual responses to events both planned and unplanned, evaluation, and improvement. This After-Action Report (AAR) is intended to assist the Los Angeles Emergency Operations Organization (EEO) in striving for preparedness excellence by analyzing Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activation response during an event and achieving the following:

- Identifying strengths to be maintained and built upon
- Identifying potential areas for further improvement
- Recommending follow-up actions

The recommendations in this AAR should be viewed as suggestions for future EOC activations. In some cases, agencies may determine the benefits of implementation are insufficient to outweigh the costs. In other cases, agencies may identify alternative solutions that are more effective. Each agency should review the recommendations and determine the most appropriate action and time needed for implementation.

The City of Los Angeles EOC was activated on May 1, 2006 at low level in response to the Immigration Reform Demonstration.

STRENGTHS

Key strengths identified during this activation include the following:

- This was a low level activation and a planned event. Many resources were already pre-deployed, hence there were few problems encountered.
- Overall communications between all the agencies were good.
- The responding EEO divisions worked well together, inter-agency coordination appeared seamless. The obtaining, managing and providing of resources also worked well during the activation.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Throughout the activation, several opportunities for improvement in the EEO's ability to respond to a large scale demonstration were identified. Major recommendations include the following:

- Additional training should be given to each department's EOC/DOC responders on using the WebEOC software as well as their roles and responsibilities during activation.
- The size of the demonstration was unprecedented, and the needs for public transportation for 400,000 people far exceeded expectation. As a part of planning for future large scale events, a transportation plan should be developed with input from the LADOT and the Metro Transit Authority.
- Only agencies required to respond to the EOC should be present. Many EEO responders that were NOT called for the activation showed up to represent their departments and observe activities.

PART 1: ACTIVATION OVERVIEW

ACTIVATION NAME

May 1, 2006 Immigration Reform Demonstration

DURATION

13 hours

ACTIVATION DATE

May 1, 2006

Lead Agency

Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)

TYPE

EOC activation Level I

SCENARIO

Demonstration

LOCATION

Los Angeles and surrounding areas

RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

- Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)
- Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD)
- Information Technology Agency (ITA)
- Emergency Preparedness Department (EPD)
- Los Angeles Department of Transportation (LADOT)
- Department of Recreation and Parks (RAP)
- Bureau of Street Services (BOSS)
- Human Relations Commission (HRC)
- California Highway Patrol (CHP)
- Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

ACTIVATION OVERVIEW

In response to the May Day protests in the Los Angeles area on May 1, 2006, the City of Los Angeles' Primary EOC located at City Hall East was activated at a Level I to coordinate and monitor the protest activities during the day.

ACTIVATION EVALUATION

The responding EOC divisions worked well together and inter-agency coordination appeared seamless. Outside agencies included the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department and the California Highway Patrol.

SEMS, ICS and NIMS were not closely followed. Section meetings in the Operations Section and Section head briefings were not held. Briefings were held in the Board Room and everyone in attendance was asked to attend. Briefings to 40-50 responders also became somewhat unproductive. There were very few Operational Area issues. The County EOC was activated in support of the City and other out-of-city marches. The WebEOC software was utilized minimally, and most responders from both LAPD and LAFD were unfamiliar with the software. This was a pre-planned event. Responding departments used the EOC for a Police and Fire joint DOC activation. Normal EOC roles with section heads reporting to management were absent.

The obtaining, managing and providing of resources worked well. GIS mapping was provided. However, GIS staff was asked by various agency representatives to produce various maps with different legends and contents. Simple requests turned into extensive work.

The size of the crowds on May 1, 2006 was unprecedented. The needs for public transportation for 400,000 plus people far exceeded anticipation. The result was over-crowded public transit systems unable to pick up passengers. .

PART 2: ACTIVATION EVENTS SYNOPSIS

Initial notification to departments of the EOC activation was on Friday, April 28, 2006, at 4:00 p.m. The EOC was activated on Monday, May 1, 2006, from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m. at Level I. Deactivation was handled in stages starting Monday, May 1, 2006 at 6 p.m. and ended at 8 p.m.

Protest routes were mapped ahead of time by DOT. Several different marches during the day were monitored. There were in excess of fifteen representatives each from the Police and Fire Departments in the EOC.

No attempt was made to block access to the Port or LAX as intelligence had indicated. However, 90% of the Port's truck drivers failed to show up for work, impacting Port operations. The slow exodus of the participants at MacArthur Park and La Brea areas caused traffic delays. This resulted in the Sheriff's Department closing a subway station due to the behavior of the waiting crowd. The DOT's Automated Traffic Surveillance and Control Center (ATSAC) provided real time visual traffic information of assembly/rally points. This info was analyzed by DOT and LAPD staff to reposition resources to maximize the safety of marchers and the public.

The LAPD reported several minor injuries but no deaths related to demonstration. There were also a few arrests made for knife possession, or felony assault with a deadly weapon against police officers. Several other arrests were made for vandalism or local businesses.

PART 3: ANALYSIS OF ACTIVATION AND RECOMMENDATION

This section of the After-Action Report (AAR) provides an analysis of how well participants as a whole responded during the activation and the areas for improvement.

STRENGTHS

- This was a low level activation and a planned event. Many resources were already pre-deployed, hence there were few problems encountered.
- Overall communications between all the agencies were good.
- The responding EOC divisions worked well together, inter-agency coordination appeared seamless. The obtaining, managing and providing of resources also worked well during the activation.

RECOMMENDED AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT

- SEMS, ICS and NIMS were not closely followed. WebEOC software was not fully utilized and many responders from the LAFD and LAPD were not familiar with the software. Additional training should be given to each department's EOC/DOC responders on how to use the software as well as their roles and responsibilities.
- GIS staff was asked by various agency representatives at the Command Center to produce various maps with different legends and contents. It is suggested that in the future the map requests shall come from Watch Commander only to avoid confusion and duplication.
- On some occasions, LAPD staff requested to operate the Automated Traffic Surveillance and Control Closed Circuit television (ATSAC CCTV) system for preemptive surveillance and assessment of persons of interest. This was in violation of the standing agreement between LAPD, LADOT and the City Attorney's Office. DOT recommends educating LAPD Incident Commanders of the standing agreement regarding usage of the CCTV system.
- The size of the protesting crowds (400,000) exceeded anticipation. The result was overcrowded subways and unruly behavior of waiting crowds at some stations. As a part of the planning process in the future, a transportation plan should be developed with input from the LADOT and the Metro Transit Authority (MTA). In addition, better liaison and communication should be established at each subway station and the actions between the LAPD, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, LADOT and the MTA.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES
INTER-DEPARTMENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

Date: October 25, 2006

To: Anna Burton, Chair
Emergency Management Committee

From: Chris Ipsen, Division Chief
Operations Division

Subject: **JULY 24, 2006 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (EOC) ACTIVATION**

On July 24, 2006, the City's EOC was activated in response to the extreme heat conditions and power outages in the Los Angeles areas. Attached is the After Action Report (AAR) outlining dates and times, responding departments, actions and recommendations for corrective actions.

The Emergency Preparedness Department (EPD) is now responsible for completing all EOC activation AARs. The attached report is submitted to the Emergency Operations Organization (EOO) Emergency Management Committee (EMC) for approval with the recommendation that it be forwarded to the Emergency Operations Board (EOB) for its approval.

EPD will track recommendations for improvement and, as appropriate, report back to the EMC.

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**After Action Report
July 24, 2006
Heat/Power Outage
EOC Activation**



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Homeland security preparedness involves a cycle of outreach, planning, capability development, training, exercising, actual responses to events both planned and unplanned, evaluation, and improvement. This After-Action Report (AAR) is intended to assist the Los Angeles Emergency Operations Organization (EEO) in striving for preparedness excellence by analyzing Emergency Operations Center (EOC) activation response during an event and achieving the following:

- Identifying strengths to be maintained and built upon
- Identifying potential areas for further improvement
- Recommending follow-up actions

The recommendations in this AAR should be viewed as suggestions for future EOC activation. In some cases, agencies may determine the benefits of implementation are insufficient to outweigh the costs. In other cases, agencies may identify alternative solutions that are more effective. Each agency should review the recommendations and determine the most appropriate action and time needed for implementation.

The City of Los Angeles EOC was activated on July 24, 2006 at Level I in response to extreme heat conditions and power outages in the Los Angeles area.

STRENGTHS

Key strengths identified during this activation include the following:

- EOC procedures were effective and all responding departments worked well together during activation.
- Inter-agency coordination appeared seamless.
- The obtaining, managing and providing of resources also worked well during the activation.

AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Throughout the activation, several opportunities for improvement in the EEO's ability to respond to extreme heat and power outages were identified. Major recommendations include the following:

- The EOC processes need to be formalized and they should be familiar to the responding agencies, especially those agencies whose personnel play a leading role.
- Training should be provided to the core personnel on the Master Plan and its annexes. Other non City responding agencies should know where they are located and how to access them.
- Communication between agencies should be improved in the EOC. This will be achieved as the WebEOC system is customized to include departmental requirements for consistent and reliable information.

PART 1: ACTIVATION OVERVIEW

ACTIVATION NAME

July 24, 2006 Heat/Power Outage

DURATION

3 days

ACTIVATION DATE

July 24, 2006

LEAD AGENCY

Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD)

TYPE

EOC activation Level I

SCENARIO

Extreme Heat/Power Outage

LOCATION

Los Angeles and surrounding areas

PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

- Commission for Children, Youth and Their Families (CCYF)
- Department of Aging (DOA)
- Department of Animal Services (ANI)
- Commission on Children, Youth and Their Families (CCYF)
- Department on Disability (DOD)
- Emergency Preparedness Department (EPD)
- Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD)
- Department of General Services (GSD)
- Information Technology Agency (ITA)
- Mayor's Office
- Department of Public Works (BPW)
- Department of Recreation and Parks (RAP)
- Department of Water and Power (DWP)
- Los Angeles Chapter American Red Cross (ARC)
- Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (DHS)
- Metro Transit Authority (MTA)

ACTIVATION OVERVIEW

In response to the extreme heat and resulting power outages in the Los Angeles area on July 24, 2006, the EOC was activated at Level I to coordinate and monitor the related emergencies and public health/safety issues.

ACTIVATION EVALUATION

Overall, EOC procedures were effective and all responding departments worked well together during activation.

Inter-agency coordination appeared seamless. The EOC, through the ITA/GIS Mapping Unit worked with RAP, Animal Services and the American Red Cross on criteria for potential sheltering issues.

The EOC processes should be current and adaptable to the changing environment. The SEMS/ICS methods and processes implemented in the EOC did not seem to fit current response needs. The intent of this activation was to assess, obtain and develop real time situational awareness from the various response support disciplines of the City to address extreme heat/power outage issues. The current system did not appear to meet these tasks. Instead, a “hasty planning” process occurred in a collective plenary session during the activation. There also appears to be a need for a core group of emergency management personnel to work with EOC Section Coordinators to ensure there is an understanding of functional roles in the EOC.

The obtaining, managing and providing of resources worked well. GIS provided aerial maps at the EOC Director’s request. EOO Support worked with ITA Network Security and Management to provide access to two critical DWP Power applications for DWP responders. EOO Support also provided some customization/modifications to the WebEOC.

PART 2: ACTIVATION EVENTS SYNOPSIS

Initial notification to departments of the EOC activation was on Monday, July 24, 2006 at 12:00 p.m. The EOC was deactivated on Wednesday, July 26, 2006 at 5:00 p.m.

On Monday, July 24, 2006, the EOC was activated at a Level I at the request of the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) in coordination with Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and the Emergency Preparedness Department (EPD). The purposes of this activation were to monitor the heat related power outages and emergencies, assess their impact on the City of Los Angeles and coordinate necessary response and services.

RAP identified and opened thirty (30) of City owned and operated senior centers as “cooling centers.” These facilities are air-conditioned and provide relief for citizens from the heat. EPD staff worked with RAP in keeping the cooling centers information current on the UPDATELA website, as well as the City’s website. City staff also coordinated shelter use and advertisement with the County of Los Angeles.

Throughout the activation, LADWP personnel responded to requests for information regarding affected customers, outage extent and restoration estimates. LAFD remained in normal deployment mode, and it reported no unusual increase in the number of incidents. The department reported that it treated approximately 31 cases of heat exposure from July 22 to July 26, 2006.

PART 3: ANALYSIS OF ACTIVATION AND RECOMMENDATION

This section of the After-Action Report (AAR) provides an analysis of how well participants as a whole responded during the activation and the areas for improvement.

STRENGTHS

- EOC procedures were effective and all responding departments worked well together during activation.
- Inter-agency coordination appeared seamless.
- The obtaining, managing and providing of resources also worked well during the activation.

RECOMMENDED AREAS OF IMPROVEMENT

- The EOC processes need to be formalized and should be familiar to the responding agencies, especially those agencies whose personnel play a leading role during activation.
- Training should be provided to core personnel on the Master Plan and its annexes. Training should also be provided to non-City agencies to ensure they know where Plans are located and how to access them.
- Communication between agencies should be improved. This will be achieved as the WebEOC system is customized to include departmental requirements for consistent and reliable information.
- Some department representatives claimed they did not get an automated message about the activation. The EOC activation notification process should be reviewed and tested to eliminate such problems.
- During activation, EOC responders requested the DWP to share its customers' information for the purpose of more effective responses. The department is reviewing internal processes for this information sharing to achieve the goal of improved communication, but it is also analyzing the security of access to its customer databases, links to such information sites, approval protocols and release of that information to outside agencies.